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I
INTRODUCTION

Definitions of academic freedom have developed in response to actual
historical circumstances. Threats to professors from university trustees
loomed behind the seminal professional definition produced in 1915 by a
committee of eminent professors for the first annual meeting of the American
Association of University Professors ("AAUP"). Threats to universities from
the state, arising out of general concerns during the late 1940s and 1950s
about the dangers of communism to American society and institutions,
prompted the cases that led the Supreme Court to identify academic freedom
as a first amendment right.
Both the professional and the constitutional definitions of academic
freedom' stressed the value of critical inquiry in universities. But each
definition understandably focused on the distinctive contemporary threats to
this value. Not surprisingly, the AAUP definition, which was eventually
accepted by many universities and educational organizations, emphasized the
protection of individual professors against lay trustees, whereas the
constitutional definition emphasized the protection of the entire university
community against state intervention. Neither definition, however, was
monolithic. The AAUP recognized the danger to academic inquiry from
legislative interference, and Supreme Court opinions treated constitutional
academic freedom as an individual right of professors as well as an
institutional right of universities.
For many years, "individual" and "institutional" definitions of academic
freedom seemed complementary rather than in tension with each other.
Significantly, the AAUP's first Supreme Court brief on the subject of academic
freedom stressed that university autonomy from the state is a necessary
condition for the academic freedom of professors. 2 Yet the dramatic growth
of litigation by students and professors against universities, dating roughly
from the late 1960s, has highlighted the tension between individual and
institutional academic freedom. Increasingly, administrators and trustees
have invoked institutional academic freedom not as an additional layer of
protection for professors against the state, but as a bar to judicial review of
claims against universities by professors alleging institutional violations of
individual academic freedom.

1. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66
Tex L Rev 1265 (1988), is the work that most explicitly identifies and compares the professional and
constitutional definitions. I find these two definitions much more compatible than does Professor
Metzger. See, for example, text accompanying notes 4-5, 44-46, 50-57, 254-58. See also J. Peter
Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 Yale LJ 251 (1989) (following
Metzger in contrasting individual emphasis of professional definition with institutional emphasis of
constitutional definition); David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, in Leonard Levy, Kenneth L. Karst &
Dennis J. Mahoney, eds, I Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 12 (MacMillan, 1986) (comparing
uncertainty of constitutional definition with elaborated professional definition).
2. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109 (1959).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's glorification of academic freedom as a
"special concern of the First Amendment" has produced hyperbolic rhetoric
but only scant, and often ambiguous, analytic content. The Court has never
explained systematically the theory behind its relatively recent incorporation
of academic freedom into the first amendment, a problem occasionally
acknowledged by the justices themselves. Without such a theory, it is difficult
to address the constitutional implications of the tension between the
individual and institutional components of academic freedom.
Some commentators have maintained that the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, seem to be defining constitutional academic freedom
exclusively in institutional terms. 4 Indeed, a major recent analysis comments
approvingly on this perceived development. 5 I disagree. Courts may have
been presented with more institutional claims than individual claims of
academic freedom, but they have also recognized that the first amendment
protects individual academic freedom. Although courts have identified both
forms of academic freedom, they have not fully addressed, and certainly have
not resolved, the tensions between them.
In this article, I summarize and contrast the professional and
constitutional treatments of academic freedom, justify distinctive first
amendment analysis of academic speech that differs both from the
professional definition of academic freedom and from the constitutional free
speech of citizens generally, and respond to arguments that courts lack
competence to decide academic freedom disputes between professors and
universities. In my opinion, academic freedom is more than just a desirable
policy promoted by the AAUP and adopted within the academic world. Core
first amendment values-such as critical inquiry, the search for knowledge,
and toleration of dissent-support constitutionalizing some, but not all, of the
speech covered by the professional definition of academic freedom. These
first amendment values justify protecting both the professional speech of
faculty and the autonomy of universities to make decisions about educational
policy. In order to engage in critical inquiry, professors need some degree of
independence from their university employers, and universities need some
degree of independence from the state. Asserting constitutional protection
for professors and universities is not simply a form of special pleading to
elevate the job-related concerns of a particular profession or the institutional
interests of a particular enterprise. Rather, constitutional academic freedom
promotes first amendment values of general concern to all citizens in a
democracy.

This functional justification of academic freedom as "a special concern of
the First Amendment" is theoretically defensible as applied only to the
distinctive roles of professors and universities. Yet first amendment academic
freedom can be viewed doctrinally as an aspect of a developing but
3.
4.
5.

Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 603 (1967).
See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note 1); Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev 1265 (cited in note 1),
Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note 1).
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insufficiently appreciated judicial trend to construe the first amendment in
institutional context. Universities are not the only institutions to which
special first amendment rules apply. Courts have increasingly observed that
the level of first amendment protection varies with the functions of
institutions. Newspapers and libraries, for example, are subject to very
different first amendment standards than military bases and prisons.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has frequently distinguished institutional
functions in explaining why more restrictions on speech are appropriate in
elementary and secondary schools than in universities. In a meaningful sense,
first amendment academic freedom is only an illustration of the general first
amendment principle that special rules about speech must be tailored to the
distinctive functions of various institutions. First amendment academic
freedom is "special," but so are the free speech rules that apply in other
institutions with different functions. These other free speech rules may not
have been separately named, as the Supreme Court has specifically extolled
"academic freedom," but they serve the similar purpose of applying the first
amendment in institutional context.
After attempting to justify the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of
academic freedom, I address the complicated circumstances in which first
amendment academic freedom claims may arise and potentially conflict.
Three basic categories stand out: claims of professors against faculty
colleagues, administrators, or trustees; claims of professors against the state;
and claims of universities against the state. The state action necessary to
invoke the first amendment exists in all three categories of claims at public
universities. In private universities, by contrast, state action applies only to
claims by professors and universities against the state. Claims by professors
at private institutions against faculty colleagues, administrators, or trustees
cannot raise first amendment issues because no state action exists. Yet a
private university can assert institutional academic freedom as a defense to
judicial review of faculty claims that the university violated its contractual
commitments to academic freedom. The state action requirement, in addition
to complicating constitutional analysis, illustrates one major difference
between the constitutional definition of academic freedom and the
professional one, which applies equally in public and private universities.
Constitutional analysis is further complicated because public universities
may invoke the first amendment to assert independence from the states that
create them, and simultaneously are themselves state institutions constrained
by the first amendment. For example, state universities may be subject to
some legislative controls from which private universities are constitutionally
protected. Yet the first amendment might also require state universities to
allow more diversity of thought than private universities. Although I address
these important issues, I focus on competing first amendment academic
freedom claims between individual professors and state universities, which
provide the context of most current disputes. I analyze claims by professors
that university decisions justified on academic grounds in fact violate
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academic freedom. Some of these claims allege that the justifications are
pretexts, while others allege that the stated grounds themselves reflect
impermissible intellectual orthodoxies inconsistent with academic freedom. I
conclude by considering attempts to extend individual academic freedom
beyond teaching and scholarship to speech on university affairs generally and
to faculty participation in university governance.
II
THE THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE

AAUP's 1915

DECLARATION

The AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles, 6 the first comprehensive
analysis of academic freedom in the United States, remains the foundation for
the nonlegal understanding of academic freedom within the academic world.
Adapting the German concept of academic freedom to the American context,
the 1915 Declaration limited itself to the academic freedom of the professor,
while recognizing that student academic freedom had been a major
component of the German tradition. The 1915 Declaration identified three
elements of academic freedom: "freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of
teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance
and action." The authors explained their inclusion of extramural freedom,
which had not been part of the German understanding of faculty academic
freedom, by observing that this issue had arisen more frequently than the
other two in the five investigations of university controversies already
completed by AAUP committees during the year since the association's
founding.7
The 1915 Declaration defined academic freedom in relation to the
functions of professors and universities. It viewed the basic role of professors
as sharing the results of their independent and expert scholarly investigations
with students and the general public. 8 Academic freedom, it added, serves
the fundamental purposes of universities, identified as promoting inquiry and
knowledge, providing instruction to students, and, reflecting a key theme of
the progressive era, developing experts for public service. 9 Throughout this
discussion, the 1915 Declaration stressed the social benefits of scholarly work
in universities. Education and knowledge, it reiterated, are essential to a
civilized and democratic society. 0 In florid but deeply felt language, the 1915
6. AAUP, Declaration of Principles (1915), reprinted in Louis Joughin, ed, Academic Freedom and
Tenure, app A at 157-76 (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1969) ("1915 Declaration"); see Appendix A, 53 L
& Contemp Probs 393 (Summer 1990) ("Appendix A").
7. 1915 Declaration at 157-58; Appendix A at 393 (cited in note 6). Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at
1275 (cited in note 1), rather than the 1915 Declaration itself, highlights the inclusion of extramural
freedom as an addition to the German model. See also Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution to
the American Theory of Academic Freedom, in Walter P. Metzger, ed, The American Concept of Academic
Freedom (Arno Press, 1977).
8.
1915 Declaration at 162; Appendix A at 396 (cited in note 6).
9. 1915 Declaration at 163-64; Appendix A at 397, 398 (cited in note 6).
10.
1915 Declaration at 161, 163, 166-68; Appendix A at 396, 397-99 (cited in note 6).
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Declaration emphasized that the university "should be an intellectual
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit,
though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen
until finally, perchance, it may become a part of the accepted intellectual food
of the nation or of the world." Yet the 1915 Declaration simultaneously
cautioned that the university also makes a social contribution by conserving
unfashionable but valuable intellectual traditions and by checking both the
hasty impulses of popular opinion and the tendency toward conformity in
modern democracies. "I
The 1915 Declaration identified threats to academic freedom as
impediments to these functions. It focused primarily on boards of trustees,
the acknowledged source of power in universities.1 2 Unfortunately, trustees,
who should view themselves as holders of a public trust in private as well as in
public institutions, too often acted as if they were simply autocratic
employers. Many trustees felt free to use the power of dismissal to impose
their personal ideological and pedagogical views on professors. Such a
conception of the university as the equivalent of "an ordinary business
venture," the 1915 Declaration protested, reveals "a radical failure to
apprehend the nature of the social function discharged by the professional
scholar."' 3 Professorial opinions lose their value if any suspicion exists that
they are not the product of free scholarly inquiry but are guided by the
untrained and self-interested views of others. Professors, like judges, should
be regarded as appointees rather than as employees, because both professors
and judges must remain independent of their nominal employers in order to
perform their professional functions. It is as inappropriate for trustees to
dictate conclusions to a professor as it is for the president to dictate legal
reasoning to the judges he appoints. Correspondingly, neither trustees nor
4
presidents are responsible for the opinions their appointees express.'
Although the 1915 Declaration focused on trustees, it also identified the
threat posed by legislatures to academic freedom in state universities.
Observing the dependence of state universities on legislative funding, the
1915 Declaration worried that legislators might try to use the state's purse
strings to manipulate the academic inquiries of professors, particularly when
scholarly views might deviate from strong public opinions or from established
government policies. While trustee interference with academic freedom
would typically derive from the opposition of businessmen to the more liberal
social and economic views of professors,' 5 state and public pressure would
11.
1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
12. Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1276-78 (cited in note 1) makes clear that the drafters of the 1915
Declaration decided not to challenge lay legal control of universities. Convinced about the certain
failure of any such challenge, they accepted that " 'outside' was ensconsed within." Id at 1277.
13. 1915 Declaration at 161; Appendix A at 396 (cited in note 6).
14. See generally 1915 Declaration at 160-63; Appendix A at 397 (cited in note 6).
15. The 1915 Declaration observed that ecclesiastical interference with philosophy and the
natural sciences constituted the main threat to academic freedom in earlier periods of American
history. 1915 Declaration at 165-66; Appendix A at 399-400 (cited in note 6).
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predictably threaten conservative professors who disagree with a political
program of reform. Whatever the ideological source of these pressures on
academic freedom, the 1915 Declaration emphasized, the university should be
16
an "inviolable refuge" for independent scholarly investigation.
The committee of professors who drafted the 1915 Declaration made a
special point of dissociating academic freedom from broad claims of faculty
autonomy. "It is," they maintained, "in no sense the contention of this
committee that academic freedom implies that individual teachers should be
exempt from all restraints as to the matter or manner of their utterances,
either within or without the university."' 7 Professors who fail to meet
scholarly standards of competence, or who abuse their positions to
indoctrinate students, cannot claim the protection of academic freedom and
can be disciplined. 18 Yet while lay governing boards are competent to
evaluate disputes over morals or neglect of duties, controversies involving the
expression of scholarly opinion must be judged, at least initially, by
professional peers, who alone have the necessary qualifications. Assigning
this responsibility to others inevitably raises the suspicion of a decision based
on irrelevant and improper motives.' 9
After substantial internal debate, the drafters of the 1915 Declaration
decided that the academic freedom they were extending to extramural
utterances should not be limited to subjects within a scholar's professional
specialties. Some expressed concern that broad protection for extramural
utterances would encourage professors to speak irresponsibly beyond their
expertise and would unjustifiably give them more rights to political
expression than other employees. The view that ultimately prevailed
acknowledged the "obvious" point that professors speaking outside the
university "are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or
exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational
modes of expression." But the 1915 Declaration also quoted with approval
the conclusion of a Wisconsin state agency that "it is neither possible nor
desirable to deprive a college professor of the political rights vouchsafed to
20
every citizen."
In context, this quotation was seriously misleading. Existing law made
clear that both public and private employees could be fired by employers for
speech the employees were free to make as citizens. In Holmes's famous
phrase, "petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." 2' Holmes could have made the
16. 1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
17. 1915 Declaration at 173; Appendix A at 404 (cited in note 6).
18. See 1915 Declaration at 170, 173; Appendix A at 402, 404 (cited in note 6).
19. 1915 Declaration at 173-74; Appendix A at 404-05 (cited in note 6); see David M. Rabban,
Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 Tex L Rev 1405, 1408-12 (1988) (discussing limits
on faculty autonomy in 1915 Declaration's conception of academic freedom).
20. 1915 Declaration at 172; Appendix A at 404 (cited in note 6). The 1915 Declaration left
open to future consideration whether professors should take prominent roles in political parties or
run for public office. Id.
21.
IcAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 NE 517, 518 (1892).
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same statement had the petitioner been a university professor. Perhaps for
this reason, and because professors actually were being dismissed for
extramural speech unrelated to teaching or research, the 1915 Declaration
"stretched the cloak of protection over an area in which academics proved to
22
be most exposed."
The 1915 Declaration conceded that some universities were endowed
expressly to propagate certain doctrines, citing as examples universities
sponsored by religious denominations, a school established by a manufacturer
to advocate a protective tariff, and an institution funded to advance socialism.
The 1915 Declaration explicitly refused to comment about whether such
"proprietary institutions" should exist, though it did observe that they were
becoming increasingly rare. Rather, it emphasized that they "should not be
permitted to sail under false colors." Proprietary institutions, which are
devoted to the inculcation of ideas, must be distinguished from "ordinary
institutions of learning," which are committed to critical inquiry. Any
university that denies academic freedom to its faculty, the 1915 Declaration
insisted, is a proprietary institution that does not perform the functions of a
true university and thus does not merit public support. 23
III
CONSTITUTIONALIZING

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The term "academic freedom" first attracted constitutional attention
during the 1950s, in connection with the more general response by the
Supreme Court to government investigations of alleged communist
conspiracies. 24 Yet even Supreme Court decisions that mentioned academic
22. Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1276 (cited in note 1). Although Professor Arthur Lovejoy played
a crucial role in convincing his collaborators on the 1915 Declaration to take this position, he
subsequently defined academic freedom as limited to teaching and research. Arthur 0. Lovejoy,
Academic Freedom, in Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed, I Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 384 (MacMillan,
1930). See Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1275 n23, 1276 (cited in note 1). William W. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed, The
Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 61-63 (University of Texas Press, 1972) ("The Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom"), criticizes the extension of academic freedom in the 1915 Declaration to include
"aprofessional political liberties."
23. 1915 Declaration at 158-60; Appendix A at 394-95 (cited in note 6). In contrast to the usage
of the 1915 Declaration, "proprietary" normally refers to institutions that are organized for profit.
See Marjorie WebsterJr. College v Middle States Ass 'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F2d 650 (DC
Cir 1970) (challenge by proprietary junior college to policy limiting accreditation to nonprofit
institutions).
24. Prior Supreme Court decisions, without referring to the first amendment or to academic
freedom, protected both teachers and educational institutions from state interference. ChiefJustice
Marshall's famous opinion in the Dartmouth College case was an early example. Trustees of Dartmouth
College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518, 652 (1819) (relying on impairment of contracts clause of
U.S. Constitution to uphold "will of the donors" against "will of the state"). Several decisions in the
1920s relied on the due process clause of the 14th amendment to invalidate state laws regulating
education. See, for example, Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284 (1927) (invalidating state regulation
of instruction and curriculum in foreign language schools); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)
(invalidating state law compelling public school attendance); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923)
(invalidating state law prohibiting instruction in foreign language before eighth grade). Many
scholars have emphasized that these decisions constitutionally safeguarded institutional autonomy
and pluralism. See, for example, Mark G. Yudof, Wt'hen Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government
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freedom did not focus on its meaning. The holdings in those cases were
25
based on traditional constitutional doctrines involving political expression,
due process, 26 and the privilege against

self-incrimination. 27

The few

opinions that invoked academic freedom did so more for rhetorical effect than
as an aid to constitutional analysis. Some of these opinions, however,
identified academic freedom as a distinctive right within the first amendment
and applied the concept to both individuals and institutions. For example, in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court decision that initially
incorporated academic freedom within the first amendment, the plurality
opinion referred to a lecturer's personal "liberties in the areas of academic
freedom and political expression" and added that "It]he essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident."-28
The relationship between the theory of academic freedom elaborated in
the 1915 Declaration and the new constitutional right of academic freedom
under the first amendment remains unclear. 29 Courts have used academic
freedom and free speech interchangeably or ambiguously, have attached
Expression in America 227-30 (Univ of Cal Press, 1983); Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic
Freedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817, 830-40 (1983); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of
Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1305-09 (1976); William W.
Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An
Unhurried Historical Review, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79, 88-93 (Summer 1990); Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loyola L Rev 831, 852-53 (1987).
25. See, for example, Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109 (1959); Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354
US 234 (1957); Adler v Board of Educ., 342 US 485 (1952).
26. See, for example, Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952).
27. See, for example, Slochower v Board of Educ., 350 US 551 (1956). The treatment in
constitutional law casebooks of the early Supreme Court decisions mentioning academic freedom
reinforces the perception that these cases were primarily about other issues. See, for example, Paul
Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of ConstitutionalDecisionmaking 1102-09 (Little Brown, 2d ed 1983)
(treating Barenblatt under heading "Can the state require speech or expression from an unwilling
citizen?"); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1406-10 (Foundation Press, I th ed 1985) (treating
Sweezy and Barenblatt under heading "legislative investigations"), 1364-66 (treating Wieman and
Slochower under heading "government demands for information and affirmation"); William Lockhart,
et al, ConstitutionalLaw 983-87 (West, 6th ed 1986) (treating Barenblatt under heading "government
mandated disclosures and freedom of association"); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, ConstitutionalLaw 131618 (Little Brown, 1986) (treating Sweezy and Barenblatt under heading "legislative investigations"),
1288 (treating Adler and Wieman under heading "subversive advocacy and association").
In his comprehensive treatise, Professor Tribe does not have a separate section on academic
freedom. Rather, he discusses academic freedom in a lengthy footnote in a section entitled
"distinguishing government's addition of its own voice from government's silencing of others."
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 812-13 n32 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988).
28. Sweezy, 354 US at 250. See Rabban, Academic Freedom at 13 (cited in note 1).
Professors interested in academic freedom immediately recognized the importance of Sweezy. "To
the members of the academic profession," wrote a professor at Dartmouth College who had served
as general secretary of the AAUP,
Sweezy v New Hampshire is quite possibly the most significant decision ever rendered by the
Supreme Court. Here for the first time in history a majority of the Court indicates its
conviction that academic freedom is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution against encroachment by either the federal or state governments.
Robert K. Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the United States
Supreme Court, 45 AAUP Bull 5, 17 (1959).
29. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note I), presents the fullest discussion of the relationship
between the AAUP definition and the constitutional definition of academic freedom. Metzger, 66
Tex L Rev 1265 (cited in note 1),provides an excellent taxonomy of these two definitions while
emphasizing how they differ rather than how they relate. See especially id at 1267.
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academic freedom to professors as well as to universities, and have extended
it to teachers in public schools and to students generally without considering
how its meaning might differ in these various contexts.3 0 In my opinion, a
convincing justification for constitutional academic freedom requires a
thorough comparison of general first amendment theories with nonlegal
theories of academic freedom, yielding conclusions about where these various
theories do and do not overlap. 3 ' I do not attempt such an ambitious task
here. But some conception of constitutional academic freedom is necessary to
analyze the relationship between the individual academic freedom of the
professor and the institutional academic freedom of the university, which is
the primary concern of this article. I therefore do consider reasons for
protecting academic freedom under the first amendment.
Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first amendment is in
many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The term "academic
freedom," in obvious contrast to "freedom of the press," is nowhere
mentioned in the text of the first amendment. It is inconceivable that those
who debated and ratified the first amendment thought about academic
freedom. Indeed, before the Civil War, when most institutions of higher
education were denominational colleges, "the problem of academic freedom
as we now understand it was hardly posed" 3 2 even as a nonlegal matter.
These colleges were what the subsequent 1915 Declaration labeled
"proprietary," concerned with conserving truth rather than with searching for
it. They did not allow intellectual freedom, and their faculties typically did
not seek it. Notions of academic freedom, to the extent they existed at all,
were associated with institutional autonomy from the democratic vulgarity of
the broader society. Only with the emergence of the modern research
university in the late nineteenth century did a comprehensive theory of
academic freedom, expressed most thoroughly in the 1915 Declaration,
emerge in the United States. It took an "educational revolution 33 following
the Civil War to produce the commitment to critical inquiry central to the
modern rationale for academic freedom, 3 4 and arguably related to general
free speech theories contained within the first amendment. "It may put some
of our current difficulties into perspective," wrote the authors of the leading
history of American academic freedom just before the Supreme Court gave
the term constitutional meaning, "that the academic freedom which is now
30. See Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1291-1322 (cited in note 1);Rabban, Academic Freedom at 12
(cited in note 1). Professor Metzger offers a particularly thorough analysis of the many contexts in
which the Supreme Court has considered academic freedom claims. In my opinion, he provides a
more coherent synthesis and rationale for the Court's decisions addressing academic freedom and
free speech at schools and universities than the justices themselves intended or than the cases allow.
31. One obvious difference between the professional and constitutional definitions of academic
freedom is that the first amendment, through its incorporation in the 14th amendment, applies only
to state action. The professional definition of academic freedom, by contrast, has no state action
requirement.
32. Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, Preface, v, to Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom in
the Age of the University (Columbia, 1961) ("Age of the University").
33. Id at vi.
34. Id at v-vi; Metzger, Age of the University at 42-44 (cited in note 32).
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under fire is not an ancient prerogative but an acquisition of relatively recent
date."

35

A constitutional theory of academic freedom, moreover, understandably
implies to many a special first amendment right unique to professors and
universities. The free speech guaranteed by the first amendment is generally
thought to apply equally to all citizens.3 6 Indeed, even the specific protection
for the press provided in a separate clause of the first amendment has been
read as providing no greater rights to publishers and journalists than the free
speech clause guarantees other citizens.3 7 In these historical and legal
circumstances, it would not have been surprising had the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a discrete though unenumerated first amendment right
of academic freedom. Even those who defend the extension of first
amendment protection to academic freedom would have had difficulty
criticizing the Court had it declined to do so.
The AAUP itself, based on more pragmatic concerns, was divided about
whether to seek constitutional protection for academic freedom. It decided
not to submit an amicus brief in Sweezy, in part because it reasonably
concluded that the Court was unlikely to address the constitutional
implications of academic freedom for the first time, 38 but also because it
worried about judicial appropriation of a concept the AAUP had largely
defined and successfully advocated throughout the academic world. Even a
favorable definition of academic freedom under the first amendment would be
subject to further judicial interpretation. What the Court gave, many within
the AAUP worried, it could also take away. Relatedly, constitutional
recognition of academic freedom could prompt many within the university
community to abandon any continuing independent effort to define and refine
this crucial concept. The constitutional meaning of academic freedom could
displace rather than complement the one set forth in the 1915 Declaration
and accepted in the institutional regulations of many universities. Principles
of academic freedom not incorporated into the first amendment could thereby
be abandoned entirely. For these reasons, many within the AAUP feared that
academic freedom would be weakened through judicial constitution39
alization.
By identifying academic freedom as a first amendment right, the Supreme
Court in Sweezy rendered moot the AAUP's reservations about whether to
argue for this position. Subsequent decisions, including one that denied a
professor's first amendment claim, 40 have reinforced the incorporation of
35. Hofstadter & Metzger, Preface at vi (cited in note 32).
36. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U Chi L
Rev 20 (1975).
37. See text accompanying notes 93-97.
38. Dissenting in a previous case, Justice Douglas objected that a New York law would "raise
havoc with academic freedom," but he did not suggest that academic freedom had constitutional
dimensions. Adler v Board of Educ., 342 US 485, 509 (1952) (Douglas dissenting).
39. Carr, 45 AAUP Bull at 5, 6, 19-20 (cited in note 28).
40. Barenblatt, 360 US at 112.
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academic freedom into the first amendment, mostly through additional
rhetorical flourishes. Yet some language in Supreme Court decisions
suggests the reasoning behind this incorporation, often using terms that echo
the 1915 Declaration and indicate close parallels between the justification for
academic freedom in the 1915 Declaration and basic themes of general first
amendment theory.
One paragraph of Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Sweezy
contains the Court's fullest discussion of academic freedom.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No
field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot
yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain4 new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die. '

This crucial paragraph, though not very helpful in clarifying the relationship
between the new constitutional analysis of academic freedom and its
traditional meaning within the university community, does seem to identify
two distinct social benefits of academic freedom. Critical inquiry within
universities is essential to the preservation of a democratic society and, as a
somewhat independent matter, promotes discoveries and understanding
necessary for civilization. Justice Frankfurter's famous concurring opinion in
Sweezy reiterated both themes. Frankfurter invoked democratic values by
stressing "the dependence of a free society on free universities,- 42 but
focused primarily on knowledge and understanding in the full range of
academic disciplines as social goods in themselves. Any "government
43
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university," Frankfurter twice warned,
would jeopardize these essential functions of professors in universities.
The Court's next significant discussion of academic freedom under the
first amendment, a decade later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, quoted the key
paragraph from the plurality opinion in Sweezy while emphasizing that
academic freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." In
describing academic freedom as "a transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned," the Court in Keyishian observed that the
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' "
The future of the
country, for reasons the Court did not elaborate, "depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
41. Sweezy, 354 US at 250.
42. Id at 262. In an earlier concurrence that did not refer specifically to academic freedom,
Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, referred to teachers as "the priests of
our democracy." Frankfurter emphasized "the special task of teachers to foster those habits of openmindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens." Vieman v Updegraff, 344
US 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring).
43. Sweezy, 354 US at 261, 262.
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discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection.' "44
These passages in Sweezy and Keyishian, though relatively brief and allusive,
still remain the Court's fullest discussions of constitutional academic freedom.
Like the 1915 Declaration, they emphasized the social importance of critical
inquiry in universities in promoting knowledge and serving democratic values.
Both the Supreme Court and the 1915 Declaration maintained that the search
for truth, in universities as well as in society generally, is never complete and
requires free debate about competing ideas that precludes any imposition of
ideological orthodoxy. The judicial opinions and the 1915 Declaration even
used similar metaphors. The description of the university in the 1915
Declaration as an "intellectual experiment station" closely resembles the
description of the classroom in Keyishian as a "marketplace of ideas." Indeed,
just as the 1915 Declaration stressed that universities should allow "ideas
distasteful to the community as a whole" to "germinate" and perhaps
ultimately to become generally accepted, 4 5 Justice Holmes, who created the
marketplace metaphor for the first amendment invoked by the Court in
Keyishian, stressed that society should allow "the expression of opinions that
we loathe" because "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
46
itself accepted in the competition of the market."
The Court's use of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor in Keyishian also
underlined its view, apparent throughout its decisions, that its general free
speech jurisprudence-particularly in relation to the search for knowledge
and truth and to the key role of free expression in a democracy-applies to
the specific context of academic freedom in universities. The Court in
Keyishian reiterated in its crucial paragraph identifying academic freedom as
"a special concern of the First Amendment" that the "vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." This language strengthened the Court's identification of
academic freedom with general first amendment values while exacerbating
47
ambiguities about the relationship between them.
The early Supreme Court opinions referring to academic freedom left
many questions unanswered. The Court never clarified the relationships
among the "special" constitutional right of academic freedom it read into the
first amendment, the concept of academic freedom expressed in the 1915
Declaration and broadly accepted within American universities, and the
general first amendment right of free speech. Despite significant parallels,
these three concepts also contained differences. For example, the focus in the
1915 Declaration on the special training and competence of professors, and
44. 385 US 589, 603 (1967).
45. 1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
46. Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes dissenting).
47. 385 US at 603, quoting Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 487 (1960). Without referring to
academic freedom,Justice Frankfurter similarly emphasized in a previous case that teachers bring the
safeguards for freedom of speech, inquiry, and thought in the first amendment "vividly into
operation." lVieman, 344 US at 195 (Frankfurter concurring).
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the corresponding importance of peer review to academic freedom, found no
echo in Supreme Court opinions. The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor,
though in some respects analogous to characterizing the university as an
"intellectual experiment station," implies an equality of discourse appropriate
in discussions of political ideas by citizens but insensitive to the relevant
differences in expertise between professors and students in the classroom. 4 8
Numerous general principles of first amendment analysis, moreover, might
have little or no relevance to the university context, or might even interfere
with legitimate educational decisions by universities based on the content of
speech.49

IV
A

FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The Supreme Court's brief discussions of academic freedom, whatever
their analytical shortcomings and lingering ambiguities, reveal sufficient
parallels between academic freedom and the first amendment generally to
justify, even if not to require, the Court's constitutionalization of academic
freedom as "a special concern of the First Amendment." 50 Analyzing
academic freedom in terms of the distinctive functions of professors and
universities, which is the method of the 1915 Declaration, helps explain, as
the Supreme Court never has, the sense in which the academic freedom
incorporated into the first amendment is not simply synonymous with the free
speech clause. This approach, essentially in agreement with Professor Van
Alstyne's classic article, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty, views the speech of professors on matters within their
expertise as subject to both greater and lesser constitutional protection than
the general speech of all citizens, including speech by professors that does not
relate to professional issues. 5'
As the 1915 Declaration emphasized, the basic function of professors in
universities-critical inquiry on subjects within their scholarly expertise and
the dissemination of the results of their scholarship through teaching and
publication-requires
freedom from constraints that threaten the
independence essential to performing this function. Such constraints would
deny the general public the contribution to knowledge and democracy that
academic work provides. These social benefits, which the Supreme Court
recognized as fundamental first amendment values in Sweezy and Keyishian
without tying them in detail to the actual functions of professors in
48. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 296-97 (cited in note 1).
49. See text accompanying notes 110, 124-25 (discussing emphasis by justice Stevens on limited
applicability of content neutrality in university context).
50. Keyishian, 385 US at 603.
51. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom (cited in note 22). Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at
263-65 (cited in note 1),agrees with Professor Van Alstyne's distinction between free speech and
academic freedom.
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universities, justify academic freedom under the first amendment as well as
under the nonlegal analysis of the 1915 Declaration.
The requirement of scholarly independence for the proper performance of
academic work entitles the professor to more freedom from employer control
than enjoyed by the typical employee. It makes no sense to expect professors
to engage in critical inquiry and simultaneously to allow punishment for its
exercise. 52 First amendment academic freedom should preclude an
administrator or trustee at a public university from forcing a professor to
investigate a particular topic or to reach specified conclusions. 53 Conceivably,
constitutional academic freedom might even protect professors at both public
and private universities from laws that would apply to other citizens. 54 The
owner of a movie theater could be punished for showing a film declared
obscene by a jury in his community though protected by juries elsewhere, but
a professor at the adjacent university might have an academic freedom right
to show the same film in an advanced course on the regulation of mass media
to make the intellectual point that the definition of obscenity involves close
55
questions on which community standards vary.
On the other hand, a professor speaking within his field of expertise may
be disciplined without violating constitutional academic freedom for speech
that otherwise would be protected under the free speech clause of the first
amendment. "The price of an exceptional vocational freedom to speak the
truth as one sees it," Professor Van Alstyne astutely observes, "is the cost of
exceptional care in the representation of that 'truth,' a professional standard
of care." 56 Grossly inaccurate speech about the Holocaust, for example,
could be cause for dismissing a historian for incompetence, but not for taking
any adverse action against a professor in the school of engineering or an
57
employee of the municipal utility commission.
52. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 77 (cited in note 22).
53. Id at 75.
54. An attempt to enforce a law provides the state action that invokes the first amendment at
private as well as public universities.
55. The AAUP filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court of Florida challenging a lower court
decision that upheld the seizure of the film "Deep Throat" from a professor of mass communications
who had presented an optional viewing to students. The professor showed the movie to give
students a "common frame of reference for debate, analogous to what ajury or appellate court might
face in deliberating upon the obscenity of a particular work." Roberts v State, 373 S2d 672, 674 (Fla
1979). The AAUP claimed that even if the film were obscene, and therefore unprotected by the
speech clause of the first amendment, the independent first amendment right of academic freedom
safeguarded the professor from state action. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 20-25, Roberts v State,
373 S2d 672 (Fla 1979). The Supreme Court of Florida found that the film was seized in violation of
state law, and thus did not reach the constitutional question. 373 S2d at 674. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 77-78 (cited in note 22), anticipated such a case.
56. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 76 (cited in note 22).
57. In 1977, a professor of electrical engineering at Northwestern University wrote a book
entitled The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, asserting that reports of the systematic killing ofJews in Nazi
concentration camps were a myth promoted by Zionists to create support for a Jewish state in
Palestine. Responding to protests about the university's failure to condemn the professor, its
provost stated: "A faculty member's right to have his writing published is not an academic freedom
issue. It is a right available to any citizen of the United States under the first amendment of the
Constitution. It is a shame when that right is used to insult survivors of concentration camps." Ellen
E. Coughlin, Professor's Book on Holocaust Attacked at Northwestern U., Chron Higher Educ 6 (February 7,
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Constitutional academic freedom thus may provide professors more
protection for professional speech and less protection for unprofessional
speech than the free speech clause would afford the same statements by

nonacademics. Yet using the professional functions of professors to justify
constitutional academic freedom means that their expressions on matters
unrelated to professional concerns, though possibly covered by the free
speech clause, have no status under this "special" first amendment right. An
engineer who writes about the Holocaust or who shows a film declared
obscene by a local jury has no different first amendment rights than other

citizens, because neither expression by the engineer concerns his professional
expertise.
This constitutional analysis deviates from the controversial position of the
1915 Declaration, subsequently reiterated by recent scholars, 58 that the
protection of academic freedom should include the extramural speech of

professors on subjects outside their academic specialties. Though the drafters
of the 1915 Declaration reached this conclusion under the pressure of cases in
which universities fired professors for such extramural statements, they

apparently relied on a theoretical justification for their pragmatic position.
Institutional neutrality, they implied, is the logical counterpart to the faculty
independence protected by academic freedom. If faculty cannot be made to
answer to the directives of administrators and trustees, then administrators
and trustees should not be held responsible for what the faculty says. 59

This approach, however, has a serious weakness under the logic of the
1915 Declaration itself.

The

1915 Declaration repeatedly stressed

that

academic freedom is justified by the social contributions of expert and
independent scholars. When professors do not speak as scholars, therefore,

they are not engaging in speech to which academic freedom should apply.
The value of institutional neutrality as a distinctive norm stresses that
universities should not be held responsible for the aprofessional speech of
professors, whether or not such speech is protected by law. 60 Institutional
neutrality, however, relates to academic freedom only to the extent that a
1977). See Seth S. King, Professor Stirs Furor by Saying Nazis' Slaying ofJews is a Myth, New York Times
A10 (January 28, 1977) (similar story); Walter Goodman, Tenets of Tenure, New York Times A22
(February 23, 1977) (editorial) (asserting that this professor was appropriately protected by tenure
because he was not accused "of carrying out his appointed duties invidiously or incompetently").
58. See, for example, John R. Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed,
The Concept of Academic Freedom 86-96 (cited in note 22).
59. The norm of institutional neutrality in the 1915 Declaration, though implicit throughout the
document, is made explicit by Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1280-81 (cited in note 1).
60. During World War I, President Lowell of Harvard risked the loss of a $10 million bequest by
refusing to deprive an openly pro-German professor of his chair. "Either the university assumes full
responsibility for permitting its professors to express certain opinions in public," Lowell wrote in his
annual report, "or it assumes no responsibility whatever, and leaves them to be dealt with like other
citizens by the public authorities according to the laws of the land." Metzger, The Age of the University
at 228-29 (cited in note 32). Professor Metzger, following the AAUP conception of academic
freedom, understandably views Lowell's moral courage as a rare defense of academic freedom during
World War I. Id at 228. But I agree with Professor Van Alstyne that in this statement "Lowell was
himself making an implicit distinction between alleged abuses of academic freedom (for which
Harvard would doubtless admit its responsibility of review of its own faculty) and alleged abuses of
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professor's speech, inside or outside the university, concerns a matter of
professional expertise.
Whatever one's view about the application of academic freedom by the
1915 Declaration to the aprofessional extramural speech of professors,
additional barriers to protecting such speech arise under a constitutional
definition of academic freedom. The drafters of the 1915 Declaration did not
have to address the free speech rights of other occupations. They could easily
have conceded that the neutrality they urged for universities should also apply
to other institutions, while adding that this issue was beyond the appropriate
concern of the 1915 Declaration, which focused on the role of university
professors. Yet the free speech clause of the first amendment, unlike the 1915
Declaration, covers the speech of all citizens. If academic freedom has a
special meaning under the first amendment, it must be distinguished from the
general free speech clause. The distinctive professional functions of
professors provide the basis for applying a special first amendment concept to
them. But what is the first amendment justification for treating the
aprotessional speech of professors differently from the speech of anyone else?
The only plausible justification is that the line between professional and
aprofessional speech may be controversial, and that protection for clearly
aprofessional speech is needed to give "breathing room" to the professional
speech that is the special subject of academic freedom. Such a drastic
prophylactic rule is unnecessary and would be likely to generate more
resentment against the "special pleading" of professors than even a narrow
and convincing conception of academic freedom inevitably does. A generous
definition of professional speech is a feasible and better response to this
legitimate concern.
There are legitimate first amendment reasons for protecting the political
speech of public employees generally. Indeed, the Supreme Court has done
so while rejecting the "right/privilege" distinction popularized by Holmes.
But as the Supreme Court has recognized, it is the free speech clause, not the
special first amendment right of academic freedom, that provides the
6
constitutional basis for this protection. '
V
HINTS OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A SPECIFIC THEORY OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The Supreme Court has not explicitly distinguished the specific theory of
academic freedom from the general protection of the first amendment, and
often refers interchangeably to academic freedom and the right to political
expression. Yet, as a number of recent lower court decisions indicate, the
judicial application of a specific theory of academic freedom would require
free speech and the general issue of civil liberty." Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom
at 80 (cited in note 22).
61. See Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 68-70, 80-81 (cited in note 22).
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only an elaboration, rather than a reversal, of the current undifferentiated
approach. For example, cases involving the rejection of Marxist candidates
for appointment have observed that universities violate academic freedom by
discharging or refusing to hire a professor "because of his or her political,
philosophical, or ideological beliefs." 62 Typically, these cases did not attempt
to identify whether the Marxist speech related to academic or political issues.
The opinions did reflect, however, the conclusion that the professors' Marxist
views are protected by the first amendment in both contexts. It would not be
difficult for courts to refine this approach by applying the specific theory of
academic freedom to Marxist speech by professors on professional matters,
and general first amendment principles to Marxist speech by professors on
aprofessional, political issues.
Some decisions, moreover, have protected the specifically academic
speech of professors. The first case produced by the recent wave of
institutional policies on offensive speech focused on their impact in the
classroom. For example, a teaching assistant in a course entitled
"Comparative Animal Behavior" wanted to include as a topic in his discussion
group the hypothesis that biological differences account for the greater ability
of men than of women to perform certain mental tasks based on spatial
relationships. The teaching assistant argued, and the judge agreed, that some
students and teachers would regard this theory as sexist and that its
presentation could subject him to prosecution for harassment under
applicable university policies. Without referring explicitly to academic
freedom, the judge held that the university policies violated the first
63
amendment.
Other cases do cite academic freedom in addressing the first amendment
protection for academic speech and seem at least implicitly to recognize a
distinction between academic freedom and general free speech under the first
amendment. Judge Posner indicated that first amendment academic freedom
may give professors more protection than the first amendment provides to
members of the general public. He reasoned that professors may express
ideas in places on campus that are not public forums and from which
members of the general public may therefore be excluded. 6 4 Another judge
identified more directly a distinction between academic freedom and general
first amendment rights. He based his finding of a general first amendment
violation on the university's failure to renew the appointment of a Marxist
professor due to his aprofessional speech and associations: his belief in
communism and his membership in the Progressive Labor Party. This
conclusion allowed the judge to finesse the university's claim that it acted
because the professor inappropriately injected Marxism into the classroom.
62. Oilman v Toll, 518 F Supp 1196, 1202 (D Md 1981), aft'd, 704 F2d 139 (4th Cir 1983);
Franklin v Atkins, 409 F Supp 439, 445 (D Colo 1976), aff'd, 562 F2d 1188 (10th Cir 1977). Both
opinions borrowed this language from Justice Douglas's dissent in Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US
564, 581 (1972).
63. Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852, 860, 864-67 (ED Mich 1989).
64. Piarowski v Illinois Community College Dist., 759 F2d 625, 629-31 (7th Cir 1985).
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The judge assumed, without deciding, that teaching history from a Marxist
orientation would be covered under the first amendment's protection of
academic freedom, especially given the fact that other professors in the
university's history department taught their courses from various competing
perspectives.65

Another judge implicitly acknowledged the added limitations on
professors imposed by a specific theory of academic freedom. A faculty
member claimed that the department of political science denied him tenure
because he had associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. In a separate
opinion, Judge Kaufman criticized the majority for assuming, without
deciding, that this association is protected by the first amendment. According
to Judge Kaufman, the candidate's behavior in covertly providing to the CIA
information he gathered during academic trips abroad cast legitimate doubt
on his commitment to the goals and principles of scholarship, threatened the
scholarly pursuits of his colleagues, and unjustifiably inhibited departmental
collegiality. Judge Kaufman did not address the relationship between the first
amendment and academic freedom. Yet his reasoning closely parallels
Professor Van Alstyne's more fully elaborated position that the social value of
critical inquiry justifying constitutional protection for individual academic
freedom may constrain professors in ways that would be left unrestricted by
the application of the general first amendment rights of speech and
66
association to other citizens.

These recent judicial opinions identify the importance of academic speech
by professors, occasionally distinguish it from speech in other contexts, and
recognize that it may be subject to both greater and lesser protection than the
first amendment usually provides. They are cause for optimism that courts
can develop a coherent and convincing specific conception of constitutional
academic freedom under the first amendment that differs from the free speech
rights all citizens possess.
VI
CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM As A SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF

THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The distinctive functions of professors and universities provide a
convincing justification for the Court's ambiguous incorporation of academic
freedom as "a special concern" of the first amendment. Yet special treatment
for a particular occupation or institution, even if analytically sound under

general first amendment principles, creates understandable skepticism,
especially given the accurate perception that citizens have rights to equal
protection under the first amendment. The argument for a constitutional
right of academic freedom can be substantially strengthened by viewing it not
65. Cooper v Ross, 472 F Supp 802, 813-14 (ED Ark 1979).
66. Selzer v Fleisher, 629 F2d 809, 814-17 (2d Cir 1980) (Kaufman concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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primarily as a special right unique to professors, but as a specific application
of the broader principle that the institutional context of speech often has first
amendment significance. Under this approach, constitutional academic
freedom is simply a convenient name to describe special speech rules
governed by the functions of professors and universities, just as other special
speech rules, which may not have been separately named, are required by the
distinctive yet different functions of institutions as varied as prisons, libraries,
the military, the civil service, public schools, and the media.
A.

Tinker and Its Progeny

The role of institutional context in first amendment interpretation, though
made clear by many Supreme Court decisions, has not been sufficiently
highlighted

in

first

amendment

theory. 6 7

The

Court's

most

explicit

recognition of institutional context occurred in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, a case upholding the right of junior and senior high
school students to wear black armbands to protest American involvement in
Vietnam. The Court reasoned that the first amendment rights of teachers and
students, which they do not "shed . .. at the schoolhouse gate," must be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. '- 68
While stressing the legitimate need of school officials to punish speech that
interferes with educational functions, the Court did not find any evidence in
the record that wearing the armbands would cause such interference. The
Court insisted that "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" did not constitute a sufficient
reason to give students lesser first amendment rights in the school
69
environment than elsewhere.
While some cases, like Tinker itself, conclude in a particular factual setting
that the "special characteristics" of an institution do not require any
modification of general first amendment rights, 70 other cases, frequently
citing Tinker, have emphasized that first amendment protections vary with
institutional context. Decisions make clear, for example, that the functions of
67. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and TheorY of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L Rev 1713 (1987), is a major exception. Professor Post stresses that the government can
regulate speech to achieve the effective functioning of its own institutions. See also C. Edwin Baker,
Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U Miami L Rev 819, 824 (1980) (asserting first
amendment's press clause can be interpreted "as granting special constitutional protection to a
particular institution, the press"); Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:
The First Amendment in InstitutionalContexts, 69 Tex L Rev 1, 10 1-02 (1990) (arguing communal as well
as individual interests should be weighed in evaluating claims that institutional functions require
constraints on speech).
68. Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 506 (1969).
69. Id at 509. In his dissent, Justice Black disagreed with the majority's characterization of the
record. Citing specific incidents, Black claimed that the record contained overwhelming evidence
that the armbands "took the students' minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about
the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war." Id at 518.
70. See, for example, Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375, 393-94 (1962) (sheriff's job responsibilities in
administration ofjustice do not impose fewer first amendment rights than other citizens to criticize
judicial behavior; no evidence suggests sheriff's criticisms interfered with proper performance of his
official functions).
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the media and libraries require substantial scope for the exercise of free
expression, while the functions of the military and prisons justify restrictions
on speech citizens otherwise enjoy.
Two cases since Tinker illustrate that its focus on "the special
characteristics of the school environment" can limit as well as protect the first
amendment rights of students. While reiterating that tolerance of divergent
views are among the fundamental democratic values schools should
inculcate, 7' the Court has held that "pervasive sexual innuendo" 72 in a
student speech at a high school assembly could sufficiently "undermine the
school's basic educational mission" 7 3 to justify the student's suspension. This
"vulgar and lewd" 74 language occurred during a speech nominating another
student for an office in the school's student government. The Court
acknowledged that the first amendment would protect the identical speech
uttered by an adult during a political campaign, but denied that "the same
'7 5
latitude must be permitted to children in a public school."
In a subsequent case, the Court upheld the decision by a high school
principal to censor from a school newspaper stories dealing with pregnancy
and divorce. The Court reasoned that the first amendment does not apply to
"school-sponsored expressive activities" if the actions by the school
'
authorities "are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. "76
Emphasizing that the standards for student speech disseminated under school
auspices legitimately "may be higher than those demanded by some
newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the 'real' world,"'

77

the Court

upheld the principal's conclusion that the student editors had failed to follow
sound journalistic practices regarding the treatment of controversial issues
78
and the need to protect personal privacy.
The Court has relied on the special characteristics of several other
institutions to limit first amendment rights. In denying protection to antiwar
speech at a military base, the Court reasoned that "the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different
application" of the first amendment. The fundamental military requirements
of obedience and discipline, the Court added, "may render permissible within
79
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."
71. Bethel School Dist. v Fraser, 478 US 675, 681 (1986).
72. Id at 683.
73. Id at 685.
74. Id.
75. Id at 682.
76. Hazelwood School Dist. v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 273 (1988). The Court distinguished the
school-sponsored student expression in Hazelwood from the nonsponsored student expression in
Tinker. Id at 272-73.
77. Id at 272.
78. Id at 276. Dissenting, Justice Brennan asserted that the school "censorship served no
legitimate pedagogical purpose." Id at 289.
79. Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 758 (1974). The Court subsequently cited the military interest in
troop readiness in rejecting a first amendment challenge to regulations requiring Air Force
personnel to receive approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force
bases. Brown v Glines, 444 US 348 (1980).
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The Court similarly has held that a prison inmate retains first amendment
rights only to the extent that they "are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system. '"80 Upholding regulations forbidding press interviews with individual
inmates, the Court observed that under prior, less restrictive rules, inmates
who were interviewed gained notoriety and influence within the prison and
became severe disciplinary problems. 8 '
In a context far less generally restrictive than a military base or a prison,
the Court also relied on special institutional functions to reject a first
amendment attack on prohibitions in the Hatch Act 8 2 against active
participation by civil servants in partisan political activities. The Court agreed
with the legislative judgment that these prohibitions are justified by the valid
purposes of preventing improper influence and corruption while preserving
83
efficient and effective government services.
On the other hand, a Court plurality has cited the emphasis in Tinker on
institutional context to provide greater first amendment rights in a school
library than in a classroom. A local school board cannot remove books from a
school library, the opinion reasoned, because "the special characteristics of
the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the
recognition of the first amendment rights of students." 8 4 In response to the
school board's claimed discretion to inculcate community values, the plurality
highlighted "the unique role of the school library." The opinion
distinguished "the compulsory environment of the classroom," where
absolute discretion by the board in determining curriculum might be justified
by its inculcative functions, from "the regime of voluntary inquiry" that
characterizes the school library, where inculcation is not appropriate. 8 5
Without contrasting the distinctive aspects of the classroom and the library,
Justice Blackmun observed in his concurrence that "the unique environment
of the school" both allows and limits the immunity of school officials from first
amendment restraints. The inculcative functions of schools, Blackmun
concluded, must be reconciled with commitment to "diversity of thought,"
which is itself a social value that schools should inculcate, and which is
protected by the "first amendment's bar on 'prescriptions of orthodoxy.' "86
B.

Media Cases

Without citing Tinker, the Court has relied on the distinctive functions of
the media in extending broad first amendment rights. The Court held that a
legislative ban on editorializing by noncommercial educational broadcasting
80.
81.
82.

Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817, 822 (1974).
Id at 831-32. Saxbe v W1ashington Post Co., 417 US 843 (1974), reaches the same conclusion.
5 USC § 7324(a)(2) (1989).
83. United States Civil Serv. Comm ni v 'Vational Ass 'nof Letter Carriers, 413 US 548, 564-67 (1973).
84. Board of Educ. v Pico, 457 US 853, 868 (1982) (emphasis in original). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens formed the plurality.
85. Id at 869.
86. Id at 879.
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stations, though enacted with the laudable aim of preventing them from
becoming agencies of government propaganda, violated the first amendment.
According to the Court, these stations require first amendment protection of
"journalistic freedom" in order to serve their function of informing the
8 7
public.
Numerous judicial decisions, sometimes relying on the first amendment
generally and sometimes citing its press clause specifically, have similarly
attributed constitutional significance to the special role of newspapers in
contributing to the discussion of public affairs.88 After several concurring and
dissenting opinions by other members of the Court supported press efforts to
enter prisons, 9 Chief Justice Burger wrote a plurality opinion granting the
general public and the press an equal first amendment right of access to a
criminal trial.9 0 In the previous prison cases, the Court majority had observed
with approval that, as a matter of practice, the press has enjoyed significantly
more access than members of the general public to prisons and prisoners.
These cases, however, rejected claims that the first amendment mandates such
a result.9 ' In requiring press and public access to a criminal trial, Burger also
took judicial notice of separate press rights such as special seating and priority
of entry. Going beyond the simple judicial approval of extra access by the
press in the prison cases, Burger tied the favorable treatment of the press to
first amendment concerns. He made the historical point that public
knowledge of criminal trials, which once came from personal observation or
word of mouth, is now generally received through print and electronic
journalism. This historical transformation, Burger maintained, "validates the
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public." In this important
sense, the media make a unique contribution to public understanding of the
92
criminal justice system.
Although Chief Justice Burger clearly viewed special treatment of the
press, justified by its institutional function of informing the public, as serving
87. FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364, 397-99, 402 (1984).
88. See, for example, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minnesota Comm 'r of Revenue, 460 US 575
(1983) (emphasizing importance of an explicit guarantee of freedom of the press in Constitution, id
at 584; threat of differential taxation of press can operate "effectively as a censor to check critical
comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press will
often serve as an important restraint on government," id at 585); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v
Tornillo, 418 US 241, 258 (1974) ("First Amendment guarantees of a free press" preclude
government regulation of "exercise of editorial control and judgment" regarding "treatment of
public issues and public officials"); Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333, 350 (1966) (press subjects entire
criminal process to "public scrutiny and criticism"); Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214 (1966) (emphasizing
consensus that major purpose of first amendment is "to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs," id at 218-19; first amendment has "specifically selected the press ... to play an important
role in the discussion of public affairs," id).
89. See, for example, Houchins v KQED, Inc., 438 US 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart concurring); id at 19
(Stevens dissenting); Saxbe v Washington Post Co., 417 US 843, 850 (1974) (Powell dissenting); Pell, 417
US at 835 (Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 836 (Douglas dissenting).
90. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980).
91. Saxbe, 417 US at 849-50; Pell, 417 US at 831 n8, 834-35.
92. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 US at 572-73, 577 n 12. Subsequent cases reiterated this point
while expanding press access. See, for example, Press-EnterpriseCo. v Superior Court, 478 US 1 (1986)
(recognizing qualified first amendment right of access to preliminary hearings).
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vital first amendment purposes, he took pains not to assert more first
amendment rights for the press than for the general public. This paradoxical
view is best revealed in opinions that anticipated Burger's approach while
advocating special press access to prisons. For example, Justice Powell cited
the "constitutionally established role of the news media" as justifying greater
access to prisons than is permitted the general public.9 3 Powell stressed that
it is "hopelessly unrealistic" for most citizens to obtain information about
important public issues without the assistance of the press, and referred to the
press as "an agent of the public," whose "underlying right" to information
requires special rules giving the press favored treatment.9 4 Yet Powell agreed
with the majority that the first amendment does "not create special privileges
for particular groups or individuals," including journalists. According to
Powell, "neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have
95
constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens."
In another case, Justice Stewart also accepted the majority's position that
the first amendment does not "guarantee the press any basic right of access
superior to that of the public generally." Stewart added, however, that he,
unlike the majority, did not "view 'equal access' as meaning access that is
identical in all respects." Given the dependence of the general public on the
press for information, Stewart reasoned that "the concept of equal access
must be accorded more flexibility" to allow the press greater access than the
general public. 9 6 Restrictions reasonable for the general public, Stewart
claimed, may be unreasonable, and even unconstitutional, as applied to
journalists. Stewart supported his position by emphasizing the existence of a
separate press clause in the first amendment, which he considered "no
constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by
97
the press in American society."
I find incoherent the view articulated in many of these opinions that the
institutional functions of the press recognized by the first amendment should
afford journalists special benefits, but that those benefits should not be
interpreted as giving the press a more favored position under the first
amendment. Justice Stewart's insistence that "equal" access does not mean
"identical"
access highlights the problems with this view. Clearly
uncomfortable about recognizing additional first amendment rights not
generally available to the public, many justices apparently consider the
underlying public benefits justifying special press rights as negating any claim
that these rights reflect greater first amendment protection for journalists.
A more persuasive analysis would require overcoming the Court's
squeamishness about granting unique first amendment rights to a particular
profession. The Court should frankly acknowledge, as it seemed to suggest in
93.
94,
95.
96.
97.

Saxbe, 417 US at 864 (Powell dissenting).
Id at 863-64.
Id at 857.
Houchins, 438 US at 16 (Stewart concurring).
Id at 17.
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a case prohibiting differential taxation of the press, 98 that special rights for the
press do constitute additional protection under the first amendment, and
justify that protection by the public benefits it freely acknowledges the press
performs. Just as the institutional functions of the military and the
corrections system permit restrictions on general first amendment rights, so
the institutional functions of the press should mandate greater first
amendment protection than other citizens enjoy. Whether restricting or
expanding general first amendment rights, the ultimate contribution to the
public derived from the effective operation of vital organizations justifies
these special rules tailored to different institutional purposes.
C.

Institutional Context and the University

Cases constitutionalizing academic freedom also indicated that the
university is an institution in which first amendment rights have special
meaning. Chief Justice Warren's pivotal opinion in Sweezy emphasized "the
essentiality of freedom" in universities and recognized that "[s]cholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust." 9 9 The South
African statement quoted at length in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
defined a university as "characterized by a spirit of free inquiry," whose
"business" is "to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation."' 0 0 Keyishian added that the university
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' " which cannot function
under "a pall of orthodoxy." 10 1
More recent higher education cases have tied the intervening focus in
Tinker on the "special characteristics" of an institutional environment to the
earlier first amendment protection of academic freedom in Sweezy and
Keyishian. The two major Supreme Court decisions applying the Tinker
analysis to universities acknowledged that the distinctive institutional mission
of the university may justify fewer first amendment rights on campus than
citizens otherwise enjoy.'0 2 In both cases, however, the Court refused to find
such a justification and emphasized that in some respects the first amendment
has particular vitality in universities.
98. See Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 583-84 (referring to inclusion of an "explicit guarantee of
freedom of the press" as "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have
troubled the Framers of the First Amendment").
Dissenting from the Court's refusal to grant a reporter's privilege against responding to a grand
jury subpoena, Justice Douglas more explicitly advocated special rights for the press. He urged an
absolute privilege for reporters based on the "preferred position" of the press "in our constitutional
scheme." This "preferred position," Douglas stressed, is not designed "to set newsmen apart as a
favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know." Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665,
721 (1972) (Douglas dissenting). See Baker, 34 U Miami L Rev at 829 (cited in note 67) (social
functions of the press "justify institutional rights beyond those already accorded by the free speech
doctrine").
99. 354 US at 250.
100. Id at 262-63.
101. 385 US at 603.
102. Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267-68 n5 (1981); Healy vJames, 408 US 169, 180-81 (1972).
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Overturning the refusal of a college president to recognize a campus
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"), the Court in Healy v.
James found no evidence to support the president's conclusion that the
chapter posed a significant threat of disruption. The Court acknowledged
that the first amendment does not protect organizations that "infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education, "0 3 and remanded the
case for a determination of whether the local SDS chapter would commit itself
to following legitimate university regulations. 10 4 The majority implied what
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence made clear: "The government as employer
or school administrator may impose upon employees and students reasonable
regulations that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon
all citizens."' 0 5 Yet the majority also warned against inferring from its
appreciation of the university's need for order any hint that first amendment
"protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large. Quite to the contrary," the Court added, invoking prior
decisions incorporating academic freedom within the first amendment, it is
0 6
particularly important to protect first amendment rights in universities.
In Widmar v. Vincent, a subsequent case upholding the right of a student
group to meet on campus, the Court emphasized that the special
characteristics of a university can permit restrictions on speech that would
violate the first amendment if applied in a public forum. The Court stressed
that a university's educational mission can justify "reasonable regulations
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities." 107 Yet
the Court invalidated a university's rules prohibiting the use of its facilities by
an organization of evangelical Christian students.
The university's
institutional mission of providing a "secular education," 1 0 8 the Court
concluded, was not sufficiently "compelling"' 1 9 to allow a content-based
exclusion of religious speech inconsistent with both the free exercise and the
free speech clauses of the first amendment.
Concurring, Justice Stevens went further and challenged the very
application of traditional first amendment concepts to the university setting.
He emphasized that universities, in "performing their learning and teaching
missions," routinely and appropriately make decisions based on the content
of speech, a suspect category in general first amendment jurisprudence.
Selecting the professors to appoint and reward, choosing the books to
purchase for the library, developing the curriculum, and allocating scarce
university resources and facilities among students groups all require
evaluation of the content of expressive activities. Legal terms such as
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Healy, 408 US at 189.
Id at 194.
Id at 203 (Rehnquist concurring).
Id at 180-81.
454 US 263, 268 n5.
Id at 268 (emphasis in original).
Id at 276.
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"compelling state interest" and "public forum," Stevens complained, not only
distract from the need to focus on the distinctive aspects of the university
environment, but "may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public
universities."' 10

Even when asserting that the first amendment should apply with particular
force in the university, the Court has never suggested that members of the
university community may in some contexts have more first amendment
protection than the general public. At most, some of the Court's opinions
have indicated that restrictions on speech that may be appropriate for
younger students would violate the first amendment in the university context.
In determining the constitutionality of school regulations, the Court has cited

differences in the "emotional maturity" of students,"' and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, while advocating greater discretion for a school board than the
majority of his colleagues allowed, conceded that there are fewer inculcative
or pedagogical reasons to limit access to ideas in universities."t 2 For example,
Rehnquist distinguished "the broad ranging inquiry available to university
students" from the need for "an orderly exposure to relevant information" at
3
earlier stages of education." 1
Yet as in the press cases, it makes sense to assert that the functions of a
particular profession that benefit the general public can justify greater first
amendment protection than other citizens enjoy. Just as "journalistic
freedom""t 4 enables the media to make their distinctive professional
contribution to the public's first amendment right to learn about and criticize
government activities, academic freedom enables professors to serve the
public's first amendment interests in fostering critical inquiry and knowledge
vital to democracy and civilization. The Court cited these public benefits in
identifying academic freedom as a special right under the first amendment." 5
However, constitutionalizing academic freedom seems much less like elitist
favoritism for a particular profession when it is appropriately viewed as but
one example of the general proposition that first amendment principles vary
with institutional context.
Special first amendment protection for journalists and professors benefit
the public as much as special restrictions on the first amendment rights of
110. Id at 277-81. Concurring in Healy, Justice Rehnquist stressed that first amendment cases
dealing with criminal sanctions are largely inapplicable in cases where the government is the
employer or college administrator. First amendment cases, Rehnquist added, "are not fungible
goods." 408 US at 203.
111. Hazelwood, 484 US at 272. See also id at 271; Edwards v Aguillar, 482 US 578, 606-07 (1987)
(Powell concurring); Widmar, 454 US at 274 n14. The Supreme Court recently has declined to grant
a writ of certiorari in a case that relied on the differences between adult college students and minor
high school students to deny college administrators "the same broad discretion in controlling their
curriculum as school administrators at the elementary and secondary level." DiBona v Matthews, 220
Cal App3d 1329, 1346, 269 Cal Rptr 882, 892 (1990), cert denied, 59 USLW 3402 (No 90-598) (US
ed, December 3, 1990).
112. Pico, 457 US at 909, 914 (Rehnquist dissenting).
113. Id at 914.
114. See note 87 and accompanying text.
115. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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prisoners and military personnel. Moreover, as a functional analysis of
academic freedom reveals,1 1 6 the same professional responsibilities that
justify additional first amendment rights of professors may also allow
limitations on their speech that do not apply to others. For example, a
professor who plagiarizes a scholarly paper may be disciplined for a gross
violation of professional ethics, while a prisoner, who in many respects has
fewer first amendment protections than other citizens, could probably not be
punished for copying verbatim the clemency petition of a fellow inmate.
Concern about creating additional first amendment rights for particular
professions also should be assuaged by the prevalence throughout the law of
legal protections based on distinctive job functions, even in expressive
contexts not explicitly covered by the first amendment. The speech or debate
clause of the Constitution gives legislators an absolute privilege for
statements made during legislative debates in order to protect the
independence of Congress as a separate branch of government.' 17 Absolute
common law privileges in defamation cases similarly protect judges,
legislators, and executive officers of government in the performance of
functions that ultimately benefit the public.'"i
Relying on the first
amendment to give special protection to the speech of journalists and
professors that also benefits the public seems equally justifiable.
In retrospect, it may be unfortunate that the term academic freedom, with
its many and evolving connotations within the university community, became
constitutionalized. Conceptual confusion inevitably results when the same
term has different meanings in constitutional and academic discourse. The
difficulties in distinguishing constitutional academic freedom from general
free speech principles are exacerbated by the additional problem of
untangling constitutional from professional definitions of academic freedom.
It might have been wiser for the Court to have developed a separate term,
such as "academic speech," 1 19 to refer to distinctive first amendment rights in
the university context. Academic freedom, however, has acquired
constitutional significance. Rather than abandon this usage after more than a
generation, it makes more sense to focus on how constitutional academic
freedom, which can legitimately be considered an example of applying the
first amendment in institutional context, overlaps with and differs from both
professional definitions of academic freedom and general free speech
doctrines.

116. See notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
117. See, for example, Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 11I (1979); United States v Brewster, 408 US
501 (1972); United States v Johnson, 383 US 169 (1966).
118. W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosserand Keeton on Torts 815-23 (West, 5th ed 1984). 1 am grateful to
Guy Wellborn for suggesting the relevance of these privileges to analogous first amendment
protection based on the speaker's function.
119. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 258-61 (cited in note 1)(using "academic speech .. .to encompass
both scholarship and teaching").
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VII
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

While constitutionalizing academic freedom in Sweezy, Chief Justice
Warren's plurality opinion and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence tied the first
amendment values of critical inquiry and the search for knowledge to the
independence of both professors and universities from state intrusion. Yet a
distinctive conception of institutional academic freedom remained only latent
throughout the McCarthy-era cases, largely because they involved state
actions against individual lecturers and professors as in Sweezy and Keyishian
rather than direct conflicts between individuals and universities. More
recently, however, universities have relied on an institutional right of
academic freedom to defend themselves both against the state and against

students, professors, and members of the general public. These cases have
prompted the courts to consider in new contexts the institutional component
1 20
of academic freedom.
Court opinions did not focus on institutional academic freedom until
1978, whenJustice Powell's opinion provided the fifth vote for the majority in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 1 Powell reiterated that
"[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."
He maintained that " 'the four essential freedoms' of a university," identified
in the South African statement quoted at length in Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sweezy, "constitute academic freedom." A university,
according to the statement, must be able "to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study."' 12 2 The Court quoted this language from Sweezy
again in Widmar v. Vincent,12 3 and Justice Stevens, concurring in Widmar,
referred to "the academic freedom of public universities."' 124 Citing Sweezy
and Bakke, Justice Stevens stressed that educational decisions based on the
content of speech "should be made by academicians, not by federal
judges."' 125 Ironically, even while underlining the institutional component of
academic freedom, the Court in both Bakke and Widmar relied on
countervailing constitutional values to overrule the universities' decisions.

12 6

120. The Supreme Court protected the institutional autonomy of universities through other
doctrines before it constitutionalized academic freedom in Sweezy. See note 24.
121. 438 US 265 (1978).
122. Id at 312, citing Sweezy, 354 US at 263, citing The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12 (a
statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of
Witwatersrand).
123. 454 US at 276.
124. Id at 278 (Stevens concurring).
125. Id at 279. See also id at 279 n2.
126. In Bakke, Justice Powell emphasized that the challenged admissions program violated the
14th amendment by focusing "solely on ethnic diversity." 438 US at 315. He cited the admissions
program at Harvard College as an example that met 14th amendment requirements. Under
Harvard's program, "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's
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Two important cases, Princeton University v. Schmid 127 and University of
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,' 2 8 illustrate the range
of complicated issues raised by claims of institutional academic freedom.
After discussing these cases, I explore the possibility that institutional
academic freedom has a different meaning for state universities than for
private ones and discuss the relationship between state legislatures and the
universities they create.
A.

Princeton University v. Schmid

A case at Princeton University first attracted substantial attention to the
potential tension between the developing judicial recognition of institutional
academic freedom and the individual academic freedom of professors that
historically had been the primary focus of this concept. Despite the objections
of many of its own faculty, Princeton relied on the first amendment to resist
any judicial review of its policies regulating access by outsiders to campus
facilities. The case arose when Chris Schmid, a member of the United States
Labor Party who had no affiliation with the university, distributed and sold on
the campus material dealing with the party and the mayoral campaign in
nearby Newark. Existing Princeton regulations prohibited any person without
a university connection or sponsorship from entering the campus to solicit
support or contributions. Schmid was arrested and convicted of trespass.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately held that new, more permissive
university regulations rendered the original dispute moot,' 2 9 this litigation
generated an important debate about the meaning of institutional academic
freedom.
In overturning Schmid's conviction, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
relied on the free speech provision of the state constitution, which it
acknowledged to be "more sweeping in scope than the language of the first
amendment."' 130 Contrasting the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment, the court observed that the free speech rights in the New Jersey
Constitution are enforceable against private as well as public bodies.' 3 ' The
court recognized that the New Jersey Constitution also protects ownership of
private property, and viewed its task as balancing Princeton's property rights
against Schmid's expressive rights.
In analyzing these competing claims, the court revealed remarkable
sensitivity to the institutional context of campus speech. Citing Princeton's
own regulations lauding the importance of free inquiry and free speech in
file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats." Id at 317. In Widmar, the majority and Justice Stevens agreed that the University's fear of
violating the establishment clause was unwarranted and thus could not justify its content-based
restriction on the first amendment rights of students denied a meeting place on campus. 454 US at
278; id at 280-81 (Stevens concurring).
127. 455 US 100 (1982).
128. 110 S Ct 577 (1990).
129. 455 US at 103.
130. State v Schmid, 84 NJ 535, 557, 423 A2d 615, 626 (1980).
131. Id at 565-66, 423 A2d at 631.
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achieving the university's declared purpose of promoting knowledge, the
court concluded that Schmid's presence on campus was "entirely consonant
with the University's expressed educational mission." 1 3 2 The court
acknowledged that "needs, implicating academic freedom and development,
justify an educational institution in controlling those who seek to enter its
domain" and require substantial judicial deference to university "autonomy
and self-governance."'' 3 3 Yet it reversed Schmid's conviction because
Princeton's regulations contained no reasonable standards relating limitations
i3 4
on expressive freedoms to legitimate educational goals.
In its jurisdictional statement to the United States Supreme Court,
Princeton complained that its academic freedom protected by the first
amendment was violated when the Supreme Court of New Jersey arrogated to
itself "the ancient right of a university community to determine how its
educational philosophy may best be implemented."'' 3 5 According to
Princeton, a private university's choice of educational philosophy, however
broad, orthodox, or eccentric, is immunized by first amendment academic
freedom from interference by the state. Princeton insisted that no
governmental body is constitutionally competent to determine whether a
private university has acted in accordance with its educational objectives.
Princeton conceded that "the university cannot claim its academic freedom as
a shield against state rules concerning health, safety and like matters," but
immediately added that correspondingly "the state cannot use its police
13 6
powers to control in any way the intellectual activities of the university."'
Princeton's main brief reiterated and elaborated this theme, asserting that
first amendment academic freedom provides greater protection to private
than to public universities. The educational judgments of public universities,
like those of private universities, are protected against interference from other
state entities. Public universities, however, are also subject to the constraints
on all government action imposed by the prohibitions in the first and
fourteenth amendments against the state's adoption of a particular religious
or ideological viewpoint. Princeton maintained that private universities, by
contrast, are absolutely unconstrained in their choice of educational
philosophy.' 3 7 Stressing "the interrelation of expressive and property
rights," Princeton made the historical observation that control by universities
over their property helped to provide an educational "atmosphere conducive
to learning and to the interchange of ideas between faculty and students." 38
That Princeton chose an expansive view of free expression on its campus, the
132. Id at 564, 423 A2d at 631.
133. Id at 566-67, 423 A2d at 632.
134. Id at 567, 423 A2d at 632.
135. Jurisdictional Statement of Princeton University at 6, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100
(1982) (No 80-1576).
136. Id at 7-8.
137. Princeton University's Brief at 8-9, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982) (No 80-

1576).
138.

Id at 12.
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brief emphasized in attacking the rationale of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, did not give the government more power to review the
implementation of educational policies than if the university had decided to
3 9
inculcate an ideological orthodoxy.'
Though the brief did not focus on the academic freedom of faculty,
Princeton did mention in one sentence that the first amendment protects the
free speech of professors at public universities from state interference.
"Academic freedom," it added in a footnote, "is, of course, especially
important to those who teach as well as to the institutions at which they teach,
be they public or private." Princeton went on to make clear its own
commitment "to the freedom of its faculty and students to pursue knowledge
in their own way without interference by governmental or other authority." 40
Princeton's argument to the United States Supreme Court provoked
strong objections from many of its own faculty, particularly those with
professional interests in constitutional law.' 41 Faculty members urged the
administration not to prosecute Schmid' 42 and asserted that the decision to
prosecute, rather than involving purely a matter of administrative discretion,
posed a policy issue in which the entire university community should be
involved.' 4 3 When these views did not prevail, the faculty focused on its
substantive disagreements with the university's position.
Several professors worried that the broad immunity from judicial scrutiny
claimed by Princeton would allow any private university unreviewable
discretion to restrict the academic freedom of its faculty. Princeton's
"distorted" conception of academic freedom, one faculty member argued,
posed a far greater threat to intellectual life in universities than either
Schmid's activities or the holding of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Boards of trustees, following Princeton's theory, could simply assert that
faculty ideas are "incompatible" with the university's "educational
purposes."' 4 4 Private universities, other faculty members feared, could
invoke institutional academic freedom to preclude judicial review of
administrative decisions to fire a professor doing controversial research, to
determine the content of courses, to revise the grades assigned by faculty to
students, and to revoke tenure without cause.' 4 5 Professors criticized
Princeton for confusing its own institutional autonomy with the faculty's
139. Id at 18.
140. Id at 9, n12.
141. Andrew Barry, Professors Relieved Over Decision, Daily Princetonian 1 col 3 (January 15, 1982);
Letter from Thomas M. Scanlon to William G. Bowen (June 29, 1981); Memorandum from Walter F.
Murphy to William G. Bowen (July 8, 1981). Sanford Levinson, an assistant professor in the
Department of Politics at Princeton, represented Schmid from his initial arrest through the oral
argument in the United States Supreme Court.
142. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 5 (cited in note 141); Letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited
in note 141).
143. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 5 (cited in note 141).
144. Letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited in note 141). Professor Scanlon quoted from
Princeton's Jurisdictional Statement at 8 (cited in note 135).
145. Princeton Alumni Weekly 15 (December 1, 1981); Walter F. Murphy, Informal
Memorandum re Schmid Case (November 23, 1981) ("Murphy Informal Memorandum").
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academic freedom, and asserted that granting the immunity sought by the
university would violate the fundamental principle that no person or
institution is above the law. 14 6 One professor warned Princeton's president
that the best result Princeton could hope for in the Supreme Court would be a
decision holding it up as a "laughing stock... for attacking academic freedom
in particular and freedom of discussion in general in the name of private
property. Making fun of Princeton-with devastating logic-will become an
47
annual game in which students and faculty elsewhere will delight."'
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court that reiterated
and expanded in legal language many of these faculty views.' 4 8 It asserted
that Princeton's "novel and sweeping claims"' 49 combining institutional
autonomy and academic freedom, if accepted, would effectively insulate
private universities from any government scrutiny. The AAUP emphasized
that academic freedom and institutional autonomy are "related but essentially
different concepts."150 Academic freedom, the AAUP insisted, "is a scholar's
right to be free of institutional (or governmental) control in professional
utterance."' 5' Institutional autonomy can be derived from academic freedom
in the sense that university autonomy from external control may be necessary
to protect its educational functions, including the functions of professors
covered by academic freedom. But institutional autonomy also relates to the
general control of private property, traditionally protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, which is no different when the property
owner is a university, the corporate owner of a shopping center, or an
individual. According to the AAUP, Princeton made a fundamental mistake
by failing to distinguish between these two very different forms of institutional
autonomy. Only when a university's claims of institutional autonomy relate to
its educational functions, the AAUP maintained, is academic freedom at
stake. 152
The AAUP stressed that Princeton's invocation of institutional academic
freedom had no connection with its educational mission. Princeton was not
trying to protect against an external threat to internal decisions about
curriculum or faculty selection, or to the faculty's freedom to teach or do
research. Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated an
extraordinary willingness to deny state constitutional protection to expressive
activity inconsistent in any way with Princeton's professed educational
146. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 4-5 (cited in note 141); Murphy Informal Memorandum
(cited in note 145).
147. Memorandum from Murphy to Bowen (cited in note 141).
148. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982) (No 801576) ("AAUP Princeton Brief"). Indeed, Professor Thomas M. Scanlon, a professor of philosophy at
Princeton who had been involved in the internal university debate over the case (see notes 141-44
and accompanying text), signed the AAUP amicus brief as "of counsel." See also letter from Thomas
M. Scanlon to Matthew Finkin (July 22, 1981) (letter to main author of AAUP brief following up
telephone conversation and commenting on draft brief).
149. AAUP Princeton Brief at I (cited in note 148).
150. ld at 5.
151. Idat 2-3.
152. Id at 2, 3, 10, 18-19.
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goals.' 5 3 Princeton, moreover, never provided the slightest clue as to how the
material Schmid distributed and sold could interfere with these goals,
prompting the AAUP to wonder whether the state court decision "is actually
one regulating the university's 'academic functions' at all."' 154 Princeton
asserted only that any judicial review of the relationship between institutional
policies and educational objectives itself violates the institutional academic
freedom protected by the first amendment. The AAUP disagreed, observing
that the free exercise of religion, also protected by the first amendment, does
not prevent the courts from inquiring into the nature and authenticity of
religious belief.155
Not surprisingly, the AAUP emphasized the dangers to faculty members it
perceived in Princeton's legal position. Princeton's broad claim of
institutional academic freedom, the AAUP warned, would effectively preclude
judicial review of institutional decisions "even in cases where the rights or
interests of the faculty might be adverse to the institution's administration."
Faculty complaints of employment discrimination or of university violations of
contractual commitments to academic freedom and tenure, the AAUP
observed, relate much more closely to institutional educational policies than
did Schmid's distribution and sale of political literature. The institutional
academic freedom Princeton invoked against Schmid would apply even more
strongly against these faculty complaints. A university could bar judicial
scrutiny of faculty contracts merely by claiming that it was following its own
56
educational policies. 1
In its reply brief, Princeton mostly reiterated its previous position;
however, it did respond briefly to some of these faculty concerns. Princeton
asserted that the academic freedom protected by the first amendment "is
freedom from governmental intrusion into the academic process." It
acknowledged that administrators in public universities could engage in
prohibited state action by interfering with the individual rights of professors
and students. Administrators in private universities, by contrast, are not
engaged in state action and thus cannot violate individual first amendment
rights even if they, like professors acting against each other, could infringe
academic freedom "in a non-constitutional sense." Yet private universities as
institutions, Princeton insisted, do have a first amendment right to determine
their educational policies free from government interference.' 5 7 The AAUP,
moreover, "grossly" misunderstood Princeton's legal argument against
Schmid by suggesting that it would enable the university to use the first
amendment as a defense to faculty assertions of contractual violations.
Princeton tersely commented that the state police power would permit the
153. Id at 15.
154. Id at 27 n8.
155. Idat21.
156. Id at 28. The letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited in note 141) makes many of the points
discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
157. Princeton University's Reply Brief at 8 n8, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982)
(No 80-1576).
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enforcement of faculty contracts,15 8 but never responded to the AAUP's

concern that asserted violations of contractual academic freedom and tenure
would implicate university educational policies, and thus under Princeton's
argument preclude judicial review, much more directly than the regulations
on outsider access applied against Schmid.
A letter from Princeton's university counsel to a faculty member who had
objected at length to the university's position in its jurisdictional statement
captures better than any legal papers the administration's reaction to faculty
concerns. The letter stressed that the legal arguments of the university in
Schmid "have nothing to do with the relative powers or rights within an
institution between the Trustees and individual faculty members or students,"
and promised in the university's next brief to avoid any possible implication
that Princeton wanted "to diminish the rights of individual faculty members
under the concept of academic freedom." Yet the letter also challenged the
view that the state is a better ally of faculty academic freedom than the
governing boards of private universities. During the McCarthy era, the
university counsel claimed, private institutions were substantially more
effective than their public counterparts in protecting scholars from state
intervention. He added that private boards of trustees, unlike the state, are
constrained by different constituencies within the university as well as by a
general ethos supporting academic freedom.
The university counsel assured that a Supreme Court victory for Princeton
in Schmid would not "directly affect to any degree whatsoever the relationships
between the trustees of a private institution and its faculty members." He did
concede, however, the possibility that "reasoning by analogy another court
down the road would apply rules enunciated in this case to the dissident
opinions of faculty and students." Yet a more realistic and directly relevant
fear, the counsel warned, was that a defeat for Princeton's position would
encourage additional state intervention in university educational decisions in
ways that might eventually constrain faculty academic freedom. He observed
the historical tendency of increased state power "to homogenization of
standards, to fear of the odd case, and to sensitivity to political fashions."
The counsel advised that professors, instead of relying on the state, including
its courts, to protect their academic freedom, should place their confidence in
the diversity of autonomous American universities. 159
B.

University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

By holding that Princeton's new university regulations on access to the
campus by outsiders rendered the original dispute moot, the Supreme Court's
decision in Schmid 160 produced a severe anticlimax, but it did not end debate
on the scope of institutional academic freedom. In University of Pennsylvania v.
158.

Id at 8 n9.

159.
160.

Letter from Thomas H. Wright to Thomas M. Scanlon (July 7, 1981).
455 US 100.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 16 1 the University of Pennsylvania and
numerous amici relied on a first amendment claim of institutional academic
freedom in asking the Supreme Court to recognize a special privilege against
disclosure of confidential peer review materials to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in Title VII cases. The rationale for this
special privilege, while made in the context of a Title VII case alleging
discrimination based on gender and national origin, would apply as well to a
claim that a university impermissibly denied appointment or tenure in
violation of a faculty member's academic freedom.
Although various federal circuit courts had held in previous Title VII
litigation that constitutional academic freedom requires a qualified privilege
against disclosure 162 or a test balancing "academic freedom and educational
excellence on the one hand and individual rights to fair consideration on the
other,"' 63 the Third Circuit "expressly declined to limit the EEOC's
subpoena authority to accommodate an academic institution's constitutional
right to academic freedom."' 16 4 The court acknowledged that such disclosure
"would burden the tenure review process and would impact on academic
freedom,"' 6 5 but it rejected both a qualified privilege and a balancing test
because they would allow universities "to hide evidence of discrimination
166
behind a wall of secrecy."'
The University of Pennsylvania complained that the Third Circuit failed to
give any consideration to its first amendment interests in institutional
academic freedom. A confidential system of peer review, the university
insisted, is essential to determining "who may teach," one of the core
components of first amendment academic freedom identified by Frankfurter
in Sweezy. 16 7 The university readily conceded that the EEOC and individual
litigants may in certain circumstances have access to confidential peer review
documents in order to further the compelling state interest in eliminating
employment discrimination. It objected, however, to the Third Circuit's
"automatic disclosure" rule, which gave no weight whatsoever to university
interests in academic freedom 68 and required disclosure of confidential
material simply upon the filing of a complaint.1 6 9 According to the university,
the party seeking such material should have to demonstrate specific reasons
for disclosure that outweigh the first amendment interests in confidentiality
161. 110S Ct 577.
162. EEOC v University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F2d 331, 337 (7th Cir 1983).
163. Gray v Board of Higher Educ., City of iVew York, 692 F2d 901, 907 (2d Cir 1982).
164. EEOC v University of Pennsylvania, 850 F2d 969, 975 (3d Cir 1988), aff'd, 110 S Ct 577 (1990).
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on its previous holding in EEOC v Franklin &
Marshall College, 775 F2d 110 (3d Cir 1985).
165. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F2d at 974.
166. Id at 975, quoting from Franklin & Marshall, 775 F2d at 115.
167. University of Pennsylvania Brief at 10-11, 17, 37, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct
577 (1990) (No 88-493) ("University of Pennsylvania Brief").
168. Id at 12-14.
169. Id at 32, 34.
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shared by universities and the professors who participate in peer review.' 70
"Institutional academic freedom-the university's right to some degree of
autonomy-is a necessary corollary," the university maintained, "of the First
Amendment rights of the individual university professor." 171 As at Princeton,
72
a number of faculty members opposed the University's legal position.
The AAUP, while appearing as a nonaligned amicus and specifically
disclaiming any position on whether the university should be required to
disclose the confidential peer review materials at issue, challenged the Third
Circuit's legal standard as constitutionally inadequate.173 The AAUP had
anticipated this issue in Schmid, where it cited unrestrained discovery in Title
VII litigation as an example of government regulation that, unlike the holding
allowing Schmid access to Princeton's campus, could impinge upon a
university's academic freedom. 74 Presented with this precise issue in
University of Pennsylvania, the AAUP characterized the Third Circuit's holding
as containing the "startling proposition" that the first amendment protection
for academic freedom "in no way limits the subpoena authority of a
government agency."'75

The AAUP saw a precise analogy between EEOC investigations of tenure
files and the investigations into the contents of university lectures conducted
by legislative committees concerned about communist subversion during the
McCarthy era. "The single most consistent and most rigorous application of
this Court's academic freedom decisions," the AAUP stressed citing Sweezy,
76
"has related directly to investigative claims pressed by government itself."1
As in the earlier cases, the AAUP urged, the Court should not immunize
universities from government scrutiny, but should balance the competing
investigative and academic interests. The AAUP also took pains to note that

University of Pennsylvania did not pose any tension between the academic
170. Id at 45-46, 49. The University of Pennsylvania conceded that the university should provide
confidential letters on which the tenure decision is based to the EEOC and a statement of reasons for
the decision to the complainant or the EEOC. Substantial evidence of discrimination uncovered
from nonconfidential information, the university added, can justify access to otherwise confidential
peer review materials. Id at 46-47. This approach closely resembles the one advocated in AAUP, A
Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosure in the Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 67
Academe 27 (February-March 1981) (attached as appendix A to AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae,
University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88-493) ("AAUP University of Pennsylvania
Brief").
171. University of Pennsylvania Brief at 16 (cited in note 167).
172. The Association of Women Faculty and Administrators of the University of Pennsylvania
participated in a brief amici curiae in support of the EEOC. In its statement of interest, the
association maintained that its members "know from concrete experience-including the denial of
tenure to Professor Rosalie Tung, which gave rise to the present proceeding-that the task of
eradicating the effects of gender-based discrimination is far more difficult, and the need to retain
unimpaired the ability of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to carry out its mission far
more critical, than is suggested by petitioner [University of Pennsylvania] here." NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund and Rosalie Tung's Brief as Amici Curiae at 29, University of Pennsylvania
v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88-493).
173. AAUP University of Pennsylvania Brief at 3 n6 (cited in note 170).
174. AAUP Princeton Brief at 25 (cited in note 148).
175. AAUP University of Pennsylvania Brief at 7 (cited in note 170).
176. Id at 5. See also id at 12.
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freedom of the university and the academic freedom of the faculty. Without
citing the 1915 Declaration, the AAUP stressed that by giving the faculty
primary responsibility for the tenure decision, the university was following a
traditional and well-justified academic policy that merited first amendment
77

protection.
The government's brief flatly denied that the Third Circuit's holding
interfered with academic freedom. While noting that prior Supreme Court
decisions had not clarified the definition of constitutional academic freedom,
the government assumed that it included the university's choice of professors.
Yet the government emphasized that Sweezy itself extended this freedom only
to decisions made "on academic grounds." University employment decisions
based on the kinds of invidious discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the
government suggested, are not made "on academic grounds" and thus are
not entitled to constitutional protection. Indeed, the government asserted
that individual faculty members have a countervailing academic freedom
interest in being evaluated on the basis of their professional performance.
EEOC investigations of peer review decisions determine only whether these
decisions are based on academic considerations or on discriminatory ones,
and thereby reinforce rather than undermine the appropriate tradition of
judicial deference to university decision-making. 78 The government
observed as well that when removing the exemption of universities from Title
VII in 1972, Congress rejected arguments that EEOC investigations would
violate academic freedom by intruding on the selection and promotion of

faculty. 179
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the University of Pennsylvania's
first amendment claim and essentially accepted the government's position.
Cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court observed, involved direct
governmental restrictions on the content of speech and on the right of the
university to determine who may teach. Unlike Keyishian, where the
government attempted to substitute its employment criteria for those of the
university, the EEOC left the University of Pennsylvania free to select and
apply its own standards as long as they did not violate the proscriptions
against employment discrimination in Title VII. The Court recognized that
the "precise contours"' 8 0 of its prior academic freedom decisions remained
undefined. Yet it considered itself fortunate in not having to provide
177. Id at 10 n9. See also Brief of Princeton University, Brown University, Harvard University,
and Yale University as Amici Curiae, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88493). Many within the AAUP opposed its policy of limiting disclosure of peer review materials and
objected to the official position in the AAUP brief. See Memorandum from Mary Gray, Chair of
Committee W of AAUP to Carol Stern, et al, Committee on Litigation (May 3, 1989) (conveying
unanimous recommendation of AAUP committee on the status of women that AAUP should not file
brief based on its existing Preliminary Statement). See also AAUP, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC
and the Status of Peer Review: A Symposium, 76 Academe 31 (May-June 1990) (various reactions of
professors and a college president to Supreme Court decision).
178. Respondent's Brief at 26-29, 26-27 n19, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577
(1990) (No 88-493).
179. Id at 12-13.
180. 110SCtat 586.
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additional guidance because University of Pennsylvania required only the
rejection of the "expanded right of academic freedom to protect confidential
peer review materials from disclosure."' 8'1 According to the Court, the
university's concerns about the impact of disclosure on academic freedom
were "extremely attenuated," "remote," and "speculative."' 182 At the same
time, the Court reiterated its continued support of judicial deference to
83
"legitimate academic decisionmaking."'
V5ing."'
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private than at public universities, but it did recognize this issue in University of
Pennsylvania, its only major decision involving an academic freedom claim by a
private university.18 8 The Court noted that attempts by government to
regulate the selection of faculty or otherwise influence academic speech at
private universities would create obvious first amendment problems.
Analogous attempts at public universities, the Court added without further
explanation, would present complicated first amendment issues because the
government would be both the regulator and the speaker. 8 9
Earlier Supreme Court decisions, however, do suggest first amendment
constraints on the institutional academic freedom of public universities that
may not apply to their private counterparts. The Court in Sweezy and
Keyishian, cases that arose at public universities, emphasized the value of
critical inquiry in universities to democracy and civilization while justifying
first amendment protection of academic freedom. First amendment academic
freedom, the Court stressed, requires a "robust exchange of ideas" in
universities and precludes a "pall of orthodoxy" or a "straight jacket" on
intellectual life. The search for truth in universities must be open to a
"multitude" of views and must not be subject to the "authoritarian selection"
of "absolutes."' 190 Even while acknowledging greater discretion for state
inculcation of societal values in the high school setting than in universities,
the Court has warned that public schools must be careful not to "eliminate all
diversity of thought."' 9 '
Recent scholarly exploration of the democratic functions of universities
supports this first amendment analysis. Professor Amy Gutmann has argued
convincingly that universities serve democracy as institutional sanctuaries
against repression of unpopular ideas, an analysis that recalls the emphasis in
the 1915 Declaration on the university's role as an "inviolable refuge' 192 for
scholarly views that challenge prevailing public opinion and government
policy. The academic freedom of universities from state intrusion, Gutmann
asserts, protects debate about politically relevant ideas from the potential
tyranny of democratic majorities or coalitions of minorities. In universities
protected by academic freedom, in possible contrast to legislatures or to
188. 110 S Ct 577. The Supreme Court's reliance on Princeton's newly passed regulations
mooted the important academic freedom issues presented in Schmid, 455 US 100. See text
accompanying note 129.
189. 110 S Ct at 586-87, n6, citing Yudof, When Government Speaks (cited in note 24). The Court's
explicit recognition of academic freedom cases at public universities refutes Dean Yudof's earlier
prediction that the ascription of first amendment academic freedom to a public university by Justice
Powell in Bakke would not be followed in subsequent cases. Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 855-56 (cited
in note 24). Indeed, Powell's opinion was not a "revisionist view of institutional academic freedom"
with "revolutionary" implications. Id at 855. Sweezy and Keyishian, the initial Supreme Court
decisions constitutionalizing academic freedom, arose at public universities, as did later decisions
reiterating first amendment academic freedom such as Widmar and Regents of University of Aichigan v
Ewing, 474 US 214 (1985).
190. These quotations are from Sweezy, 354 US at 250, and Keyishian, 385 US at 603. See notes
41-44 and accompanying text.
191. Pico, 457 US at 879 (Blackmun concurring). See also Bethel School Dist., 478 US at 681.
192. 1915 Declaration at 167; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
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general political debate, ideas are evaluated on their scholarly merits, not
their political popularity.' 9 3 Unpopular ideas kept alive in universities remain
available to the broader society.
The democratic functions of universities, however, may have more salience
in public institutions, where, as the Supreme Court has observed, the state is
the speaker as well as the regulator. Public universities, themselves bound by
the first amendment in their relationships with faculty and students, may have
less discretion than private universities in selecting educational purposes that
arguably deviate from democratic values. The same educational choices that
might violate the first amendment obligations of public universities to
diversity of thought might be protected by the first amendment academic
freedom of private universities against state intrusion. For example, the
private "proprietary institutions" identified in the 1915 Declaration, formed
to advocate a protective tariff or socialism, might have institutional academic
freedom from state attempts to require more diversity of thought, even
though the first amendment might preclude the state from establishing such
institutions. Similarly, a private university might have academic freedom to
declare itself an "ivory tower" committed to the world of ideas
uncontaminated by influences from the outside world, and therefore might be
permitted to impose absolute restrictions on public access to the campus that
might violate the first amendment if adopted by a public university. If
Princeton, rather than inviting public use of its campus, had declared itself
such an ivory tower, the Supreme Court of New Jersey might have deferred to
this choice of educational policy.'

94

However, Rutgers, the major state

university in New Jersey, might not have similar discretion in choosing an
educational policy that precludes public access.
Arguably, this first amendment combination of limiting state interference
with the discretion of private universities while constraining their public
counterparts itself promotes democratic values. Private universities may
choose to establish educational policies that deviate from democratic values in
ways forbidden to state institutions. The resulting pluralism within the
academic world, however, may provide more tolerance for diverse and
193. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 174, 179 (Princeton, 1987). See also Amy Gutmann, Is
Freedom Academic?: The Relative Autonomy of Universities in a Liberal Democracy in J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman, eds, Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy 257, 271 (New York Univ Press, 1983). Professor
Byrne makes a similar point to support first amendment academic freedom for universities.
Independent and expert critical thought in universities, he maintains, is "crucial for society as a
whole because it provides a standard by which to gauge how trivial, debased, and false is much public
discussion of affairs." Byrne, 99 Yale L J at 334 (cited in note 1).
194. See Schmid, 84 NJ at 564-65, 423 A2d at 631. But see Sanford Levinson, Princeton v. Free
Speech: A Post Mortem in Craig Kaplan & Ellen Schrecker, eds, Regulating the Intellectuals 200 (Praeger,
1983) ("republican form of government" guaranteed by Article IV of U.S. Constitution requires
"voting citizens of the United States freedom to interact with their fellow citizens-whether students
or outsiders-in conversation about the great issues of the polity"). See also Gutmann, Nomos 25:
Liberal Democracy at 267-68 (cited in note 193) (though "secluded residential college dedicated to
religious indoctrination" has a better argument than Princeton for restricting access to campus by
local political candidates, the democratic "right of political communication" may outweigh the "right
of religious education").

Page 227: Summer 1990]

"INDIVIDUAL" & "INSTITUTIONAL" ACADEMIC FREEDOM

269

unpopular views than a rule that would subject all universities to the
commitment to diversity of thought that the first amendment imposes on
public ones.' 9 5
Private universities may have purposes unrelated to education that
similarly allow them to deviate from first amendment limitations on public
universities. A university affiliated with a religious denomination, another
example in the 1915 Declaration of a proprietary institution, may make
institutional choices for religious rather than educational reasons, and those
choices may be protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
A Catholic university could require its teachers to adhere to the Church's
theological position on artificial contraception, 1 9 6 and a fundamentalist
195. Dean Yudof emphasizes that the first amendment can foster pluralism by protecting private
speech and by limiting government expression. He prefers the first approach because limiting
government expression presents "dangers of judicial overreaching" and "remedial quandaries."
Yudof, When Government Speaks at 200 (cited in note 24). "Any judicial decision protecting the right of
private individuals, groups, or organizations to speak," he reasons, "strengthens their ability to
communicate and increases their potential to counter government messages." Id at 201. Applying
this general principle, he maintains that "institutional academic freedom protects the private school
from an overreaching government authority," and "tends to diminish the ability of government to
suppress competing ideas and ideologies." Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 852-53 (cited in note 24).
Dean Yudof, who finds prior decisions protecting individual academic freedom "difficult to
justify," Yudof, When Government Speaks at 215 (cited in note 24), would interpret them as part of his
general approach to government speech. He suggests that "the focus should be not on the
constitutional entitlements of the teacher per se, . . . but on the place of the teacher in the system of
government expression." Id at 216. He indicates that first amendment protection for individual
academic freedom, though unsupported by arguments derived from personal autonomy, Yudof, 32
Loyola L Rev at 838 (cited in note 24), can be justified by the fact that "the autonomy of the
classroom teacher contributes to a diminution of the power of government to work its
communication will" and thereby introduces "a sort of pluralism into the school environment."
Yudof, When Government Speaks at 216 (cited in note 24). Yet Dean Yudof resists constitutional
protection for the academic freedom of public institutions. Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 855-56 (cited
in note 24). See note 189.
Professor Gutmann might impose greater constraints than Dean Yudof on private universities.
She rejects the "corporate pluralist" argument, which is "corporatist in ascribing a right to autonomy
to private institutions, and pluralist in proclaiming the value of diversity among those institutions."
Gutmann, Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy at 261-62 (cited in note 193). The need for universities to
serve as an "institutional sanctuary for the process of free intellectual inquiry essential to democratic
politics," she maintains, applies to both private and public institutions. Id at 263. A democratic state
should promote liberal over nonliberal private universities because it depends "upon the free
development and dissemination of ideas to which liberal universities are uniquely dedicated as social
institutions." Id at 264. Yet Gutmann acknowledges that "a university with explicitly nonliberal
religious purposes may need to restrict the academic freedom of its faculty as a means of furthering
its purposes." Apparently, Gutmann favors greater discretion for private universities than for public
ones, limited by state determinations that private "purposes and policies" are "incompatible with the
effective exercise of other basic rights supporting citizenship in a democratic society." Id at 263. See
also Levinson, Princeton v. Free Speech at 200-02 (cited in note 194) (constitutional guarantee of
"republican form of government" limits discretion of private universities).
Dean Yudof, though perhaps favoring more discretion for private universities than Professors
Gutmann or Levinson, agrees that the state can impose limits on institutional autonomy. "In each
case," he writes, "the compelling nature of the public policy and the limits of tolerance must balance
against the specific infringement on institutional autonomy. Not surprisingly, principled results are
frequently illusive." Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 853-54 (cited in note 24). See text accompanying
notes 201-08 (discussing tensions between state and university interests).
196. See Curran v Catholic University of America, No 1562-87 (DC Superior Ct, filed February 28,
1989) (unpublished opinion on file with court) (rejecting claim that university breached professor's
contractual right to academic freedom). "On some issues," the court reasoned, "the conflict
between the University's commitment to academic freedom and its unwavering fealty to the Holy See

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 3

Protestant university could require the exclusive teaching of "creation
science" even if this theory has no respectable scholarly or pedagogical
basis. 197
The freedom of association protected by the first amendment and basic
property rights provide additional constitutional protections for the
institutional choices of private universities.' 9 8 A private university might
decide to limit access by outsiders, not for the educational purpose of creating
an ivory tower, but simply to keep its property clean. 99 Yet as the AAUP
maintained in Schmid, a private university cannot appropriately base its claims
of autonomy on institutional academic freedom unless they can be justified on
20 0
educational grounds.
Even when it is legitimately invoked, institutional academic freedom at
both private and public universities may compete with and at times succumb
to other state interests. For example, the fourteenth amendment imposes
barriers to university affirmative action plans, 20 ' just as government
commitments to affirmative action could jeopardize university interests in

is direct and unavoidable. On such issues, the University may choose for itself on which side of that
conflict it wants to come down, and nothing in its contract with Professor Curran or any other faculty
member promises that it will always come down on the side of academic freedom." Id at 34. But see
Academic Freedom and Tenure: The Catholic University of America, 75 Academe 27, 37 (September-October
1989) (AAUP investigating committee finds that University violated Curran's academic freedom by
forcing him to relinquish all teaching of Catholic theology). Compare Charles E. Curran, Academic
Freedom and Catholic Universities, 66 Tex L Rev 1441 (1988) (arguing for greater academic freedom at
Catholic universities than official Church documents and legislation allow) with Douglas Laycock &
Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 Tex L Rev 1455 (1988)
(arguing that free exercise clause precludes courts from determining extent of academic freedom at
Catholic universities). See also Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and
Universities, 53 L & Contemp Probs 303 (Summer, 1990).
197. Compare Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987) (law forbidding teaching of evolution in
public schools unless "creation science" is also taught violates establishment clause of first
amendment).
198. Dean Yudof recognizes freedom of association as "an immensely reasonable gloss to place
on freedom of expression once one recognizes the desirability of countering the communications
power of governments in a democracy." Yudof, When Government Speaksi at 258 (cited in note 24). See
id at 255-58.
199. Compare NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US 105, 107, 112 (1956) (employer interest in
controlling property and preventing litter justify refusal to allow distribution of literature by union
organizers in company parking lot) with Schneider v State, 308 US 141, 162 (1939) (city ordinance
prohibiting distribution of handbills to pedestrians on public streets violates first amendment;
legislative purpose of keeping streets clean is "insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a
person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it").
200. See text accompanying notes 152-55. Professor Finkin, the primary author of the AAUP
brief in Schmid, reiterated this point in a subsequent article. Professor Finkin finds "particularly
perverse" the application of the term "academic freedom" to institutional autonomy based on "an
excresence of property rights . . . unrelated to the maintainence of conditions of academic freedom
within the institution." Finkin, 61 Tex L Rev at 839 (cited in note 24). Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 321-22
(cited in note 1), agrees with Finkin. See also Gutmann, Vomos 25: Liberal Democracy at 276 (cited in
note 193) ("academic freedom as an institutional right ... is not so broad as to permit any university
to defend itself against those governmental regulations that are compatible with, or instrumental to
achieving, a university's self-proclaimed educational purposes").
201. Bakke, 438 US 265.
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selecting faculty and students.2 0 2 First amendment public forum analysis can
limit the discretion of state universities to restrict even for legitimate
educational purposes the use of their facilities unless those purposes are
"compelling." 20 3 State constitutions that give individuals a right to speak on
private property must be balanced against the interests of universities in
determining their own purposes and policies.2 0 4 Threats to national security
20 5
or public health may justify state restrictions on university research.
Genuine religious beliefs may have to give way to competing public
interests.2 0

6

It

may

be

that

most

government

regulations,

such

as

accreditation requirements and prohibitions against racial discrimination,
rarely interfere with any legitimate interests of universities.2 0 7 But the
interests of universities can conflict with those of governments and citizens,
and close questions may arise when these conflicting interests are both
208

strong.
B.

Does Institutional Academic Freedom Protect State Universities from
Other Branches of Government?

In contrast to private universities, state universities may be constrained by
both the first amendment and the state that creates and funds them. Despite
judicial reiteration that institutional academic freedom encompasses the four
essential freedoms of a university identified in Sweezy, substantial ambigu ity
exists regarding the scope of those freedoms. State legislatures often fund
community colleges as well as four-year colleges, establish agricultural
colleges as well as liberal arts universities, and determine which state
universities may offer graduate degrees in various subjects. Insufficient
legislative appropriations can lead to the elimination of existing faculty
positions, 20 9 and legislatures can refuse to provide any funding for
universities. These legislative decisions clearly limit the freedom of state
colleges and universities to determine "who may teach," "what may be
202. See Byrne, 99 Yale L J at 282-83 (cited in note 1) (observing legitimate tension between
some affirmative action plans that may be "derogations from accepted notions of professional
competence for political reasons" and traditional notions of academic freedom).
203. See, for example, Widmar, 454 US 263, 269-70, 276-77.
204. See, for example, Schmid, 84 NJ at 560, 423 A2d at 628.
205. See Rabban, 66 Tex L Rev at 1419 (cited in note 19).
206. See Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 602-04 (1983) (denial of student
admission based on genuine university belief that Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage
outweighed by fundamental government interest in eliminating racial discrimination).
207. See, for example, Gutmann, Democratic Education at 179-80 (cited in note 193); Finkin, 61 Tex
L Rev at 855-56 (cited in note 24); Gutmann, Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy at 276 (cited in note 193);
Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 853-54 (cited in note 24). But see Dallin H. Oaks, A Private University Looks
at Government Regulation, 4 J Coil & Univ L 1, 3-4 (1976) (claiming most federal regulation of
universities constitutes interference in management of educational functions that violates academic
freedom).
208. See Gutmann, Democratic Education at 187 (cited in note 193); Gutmann, Nomos 25: Liberal
Democracy at 266, 282-83 (cited in note 193).
209. See, for example, Johnson v Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 377 F Supp 227
(WD Wis 1974), aff'd, 510 F2d 975 (9th Cir 1975); Levitt v Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges,
376 F Supp 945 (D Neb 1974).
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taught," and "who may be admitted to study," but no one has ever argued
that they violate a public university's institutional academic freedom.
In some states, constitutional provisions establish state university systems
as a separate branch of government. State courts have interpreted these
provisions to preclude legislative attempts to fix the location of academic
departments and the percentage of out-of-state students. 2 10 But in the
majority of states, in which no constitutional separation of powers exists to
protect the state university, it seems difficult to argue that the first amendment
poses a bar to such legislative decisions. 21 ' Legislative attempts to dictate to
private universities the composition of their student bodies or their general
educational purposes, by contrast, would surely implicate their institutional
academic freedom.
As decisions like Sweezy and Keyishian make clear, however, first
amendment academic freedom imposes some limitations on legislative and
administrative regulation of public universities. In Sweezy, the New Hampshire
legislature violated the first amendment academic freedom of a university
lecturer and of the "academic community 21 2 by establishing a program of
legislative investigations into subversive activities that included inquiries into
the contents of a lecture at the University of New Hampshire. In Keyishian, a
combination of vague statutes and administrative regulations violated first
amendment academic freedom by subjecting professors to possible dismissal
for teaching the principles of Marxism.

21 3

The solicitor general explicitly distinguished Sweezy and Keyishian during
oral argument in University of Pennsylvania, stressing that the EEOC's inquiry
into the tenure process had "nothing to do with the world of ideas" and did
not touch on classroom speech. 21 4 The Supreme Court's decision echoed this
theme, and reinforced Sweezy and Keyishian by contrasting the legislative
restrictions on the content of speech and on the university's selection of
professors in those cases with the EEOC's investigation into whether the
university had violated federal
prohibitions against employment
discrimination. The Court made a special point of emphasizing that it would
210. Regents of the University ofMichigan v State, 47 Mich App 23, 208 NW2d 871 (1973) dismissed
as moot, 395 Mich 52, 235 NW2d 1 (1975) (unconstitutional for legislature to fix percentage of outof-state students); Sterling v Regents of the University of Michigan, 110 Mich 369, 68 NW 253 (1896)
(unconstitutional for legislature to determine location of departments). See Byrne, 99 Yale L J at
327-28 (cited in note 1).
211. Professor Byrne maintains that state constitutional autonomy for universities as a separate
branch of government provides a "legal source for constitutional academic freedom." Byrne, 99
Yale LJ at 327 (cited in note 1). 1 find this argument unpersuasive. The fact that a few states have
constitutionally provided for university autonomy does not suggest that similar protection should be
read into the first amendment. Byrne cites only nine states that have explicitly provided
constitutional autonomy for universities, though he adds that in an unidentified number of other
states "courts have been willing to interpret often ambiguous constitutional language as imposing
limitations on the legislature." Id at 327 n303.
212. Sweezy, 354 US at 245.
213. Keyishian, 385 US at 600.
214. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 43,
University' of Pennsylvania v EEOC (Nov 7, 1989) (No 88-493) ("University of Pennsylvania Oral
Argument").
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not "retreat" from its longstanding respect for the right of universities to
2 5
make their own academic decisions. 1
Some legislative and administrative controls over state universities seem
clearly permissible, while others just as clearly violate the institutional
academic freedom constitutionalized by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately,
prior cases offer scant guidance in determining exactly when state actions
violate the constitutional rights of institutions the state itself has created. As
the earlier discussion of institutional context indicates,2 1 6 however, some
analytical hints have appeared in recent cases involving a variety of state
institutions, including universities.
Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters217 provides the
most clues about first amendment constraints on government regulation of its
own institutions. The same congressional legislation that created and funded
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting forbade editorializing by
noncommercial educational broadcasting stations receiving grants from the
2 18
corporation. Many of these stations are publicly owned and financed.
While recognizing that this congressional ban on editorializing was designed
to serve the public's interest in receiving balanced coverage, 21 9 the Court held
that it violated "important journalistic freedoms which the first amendment
22 0
jealously protects."
Because "broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of
communicative activity," the Court reasoned, "the first amendment must
inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its
regulatory power in this area." The Court concluded that the legitimate
public interest in balanced coverage depends largely on "the editorial
initiative and judgment of broadcasters who bear the public trust." 22 '
Alternative regulatory means, the Court observed, could serve the public
interest in balanced coverage without jeopardizing "the 'journalistic freedom'
of noncommercial broadcasters." 2 22 This recognition of the first amendment
value of "journalistic freedom" parallels the Court's emphasis on the first
amendment value of "academic freedom" in Sweezy and Keyishian.
Significantly, even the dissenters recognized that broadcasters have first
amendment rights. They observed that Congress could not condition funding
for public stations on the broadcasters' agreement to avoid controversial
subjects 2 23 or to promote particular viewpoints.2 2 4 Justice Stevens stressed in
dissent that the ban on editorializing was enacted "to avoid the risk that some
215. IOSCt at 587.
216. See Part VI.
217. 468 US 364 (1984).
218. Id at 390 n19, 391 n20.
219. Idat 378.
220. Id at 402.
221. Idat 378.
222. Id at 398, citing Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic National Committee, 412 US 94,
110 (1973).
223. Id at 407 (Rehnquist dissenting).
224. Id at 414 (Stevens dissenting).
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speakers will be rewarded or penalized for saying things that appealed to-or
'
are offensive to-the sovereign. "225

In distinguishing state-created institutions from public forums, 22 6 the
Court has underlined both the general first amendment prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination and the principle that certain institutions have
traditional and broadly accepted expressive functions the state must accept
227
when it creates them. Dissenting in Southeastern Promotions, Limited v. Conrad,
Justice Rehnquist foreshadowed subsequent majority decisions when he
criticized the Court for applying public forum doctrine to the production
decisions of a community-owned theater. The majority overturned on first
amendment procedural grounds the rejection by the theater directors of an
application to present the controversial rock musical "Hair," which contained
group nudity and simulated sex. Rehnquist conceded in dissent that a
municipal theater, unlike a private one, cannot "judge on a content basis
alone" which plays to perform. 22 8 He noted, for example, that a municipal
auditorium could not forbid a production of "Hair" based on opposition to
the musical's political and social views while allowing performances of
"equally graphic productions" whose ideas did not offend. 2 29 Yet he added
that the element of a municipal theater "which is 'theater' ought to be
accorded some constitutional recognition along with that element of it which
is 'municipal.' "230 At the very least, the directors of the municipal theater
should have some discretion to decide what performances to book. Surely,
Rehnquist suggested, a municipal theater should be able to devote an entire
season to Shakespeare rather than to accept all bookings in order of
23
application date until no openings are left. '

The Court majority's subsequent recognition in Widmar v. Vincent that the
educational mission of a university distinguishes it "in significant respects
from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters" 23 2
seems to accept Justice Rehnquist's distinction in Southeastern Promotions

between public forums and state-created institutions. The Widmar majority's
reiteration of the "four essential freedoms" quoted by Frankfurter in
Sweezy 23 3 also reinforced Rehnquist's indication that the functions of state
institutions may require first amendment protection for content-based
decisions made within them. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion elaborated
by maintaining that the institutional academic freedom of public universities
should allow them to make educationally related appointment and curricular
225. Id.
226. See generally Post, 34 UCLA L Rev 1713 (cited in note 67). Professor Post distinguishes
between government management of its own institutions for instrumental purposes and its
regulation of public forums.
227. 420 US 546 (1975).
228. Id at 573 (Rehnquist dissenting).
229. Id at 572 n2.
230. Id at 573-74.
231. Id at 571-73.
232. 454 US at 268 n5.
233. Id at 276.
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decisions based on the content of speech.2 34 Lower-court decisions have
underlined this approach, recognizing that the expressive functions of state
university newspapers and public broadcasting stations justify first
2 35
amendment protection for their editorial discretion.
The functions of some state institutions might be contested. For example,

the differing conclusions ofJustices Brennan and Rehnquist in Pico 236 derived
largely from their disagreement about the functions of a school library. Both
justices agreed that the state cannot force its own institutions to suppress
ideas based merely on disagreement with their content, but that it can
consider the institution's functions in regulating the content of speech.
Justice Brennan stressed the "unique role of the school library" in providing

"wholly

optional"

opportunities

for

"self-education"

and

"individual

enrichment." He distinguished "the regime of voluntary inquiry" in the
23 7
school library from the "compulsory environment of the classroom."

Justice Rehnquist dismissed this characterization of the role of a school library
as Brennan's own unsupported "creation." Criticizing Brennan for relying on
precedents dealing with public libraries and universities, Rehnquist concluded
that Brennan's "reasoning misapprehends the function of libraries in our
public school system."
In contrast to "university or public libraries,

elementary and secondary school libraries are not designed for freewheeling
inquiry; they are tailored, as the public school curriculum is tailored, to the
teaching of basic skills and ideas." Indeed, the school library is "the one
public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective
2 38
conveyance of ideas."

It is extremely revealing that the dispute between Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist over the function of a school library provoked Justice Rehnquist to
affirm his understanding of university libraries as places devoted to
"freewheeling inquiry." Quite clearly, Rehnquist would not allow a university
234. Id at 277-78. See text accompanying notes 110, 124-25 (discussing Stevens's concurrence).
235. See, for example, Schneider v Indian River Community College Foundation, 875 F2d 1537, 1541
(11 th Cir 1989) (college trustees, as licensees of public radio station, have first amendment right to
exercise programming discretion; "the degree of control which can be exercised consistently with the
First Amendment depends on the mission of the communicative activity being controlled"); Estiverne
v Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F2d 371, 381-82 (5th Cir 1989) (state bar journal not public forum;
editors have "editorial discretion" to refuse to publish letter based on the journal's purposes but not
on the letter's viewpoint); Muir v Alabama Educational Television Comm'n, 688 F2d 1033, 1041, 1044
(5th Cir 1982) (public television station not public forum; "First Amendment does not preclude the
government from exercising editorial control over its own medium of expression"); id at 1052
(Rubin concurring) ("state's discretion is confined by the functions it may perform as a broadcast
licensee, and the purpose to which it has dedicated its license");Joyner v Whiting, 477 F2d 456, 460
(4th Cir 1973) (college cannot suppress student newspaper "because college officials dislike its
editorial content"); Bazaar v Fortune, 476 F2d 570, 574 (5th Cir 1973) (state university cannot
"'support a campus newspaper and then try to restrict arbitrarily what it may publish, even if only to
require that material be submitted to a faculty board to determine whether it complies with
'responsible freedom of the press' "), citing ACLU v Radford College, 315 F Supp 893, 896-97 (WD Va
1970).
236. 437 US 853.
237. Id at 869.
238. Id at 914-15 (Rehnquist dissenting).
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or a state legislature to remove from a university library the books he would
have allowed the school board to remove from school libraries in Pico.
Regulation of lawyers employed by the state similarly illustrates that
appropriate restrictions on speech in one kind of state institution may be
unconstitutional in others. The solicitor general, whose function is to support
government positions before the Supreme Court, should be able to condition
continued employment of staff attorneys on their advocacy of legal arguments
that conform to government policy. By contrast, a state university, whose
function is to promote critical inquiry in the search for knowledge, should not
be able to condition continued employment of law professors on their
advocacy of legal arguments favored by the dean or the state legislature. 2 39
Yet legislation requiring the teaching in law school of "practical" courses
designed to prepare lawyers for practice in the state may be justified as
furthering a valid institutional purpose.
The reasoning of cases such as Federal Communications Commission, Widmar,
and Pico also suggests that a state cannot simply announce its departure from
traditionally understood institutional functions. 240 A state could not, for
example, create a university devoted exclusively to the inculcation of societal
values rather than to critical inquiry. Pico indicates that the first amendment
requires even a secondary school to allow "some limits" on its inculcative
functions, and that what may be a permissible mix of inculcation and

239. I am grateful to David Anderson for suggesting this comparison.
240. Dean Yudof's analysis of the delegation of authority by political branches of government to
institutions exercising specialized functions imposes substantial restrictions on government
interference in those institutions. His analysis, however, does not preclude the government from
restructuring or changing the functions of its own institutions. See Yudof, When Government Speaks at
135-38, 240-45 (cited in note 24); Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest
for the Archimedean Point, 59 Ind LJ 527, 553-59 (1984).
Dean Yudof observes that elected government officials frequently delegate specialized
government functions to state institutions such as schools and universities, hospitals, student
newspapers, public television stations, and libraries. Considerations of expertise and efficiency often
lie behind delegations to professionals within state agencies. Yudof, When Government Speaks at 136,
243 (cited in note 24). These delegations, as Yudof observes with approval, often have the welcome
benefits of serving as "a bulwark against the centralized orchestration of a publicly established
orthodoxy," Yudof, 59 Ind LJ at 553 (cited in this note), and of preventing "political interference"
in state institutions. Yudof, When Government Speaks at 136 (cited in note 24). Yudof would even
recognize de facto delegations when higher government officials have no policy on institutional
functions. Yudof, 59 Ind L J at 555 (cited in this note). Ad hoc revocations of prior voluntary
delegations for the purpose of censoring particular ideas, Yudof maintains, should be considered
first amendment violations. Yudof, When Government Speaks at 243 (cited in note 24).
Although Dean Yudof recognizes that delegations of government authority promote first
amendment interests in preventing "government established orthodoxy" and "ideological
indoctrination," he would not interpret the first amendment to require delegation. Yudof, 59 Ind LJ
at 554 (cited in this note). He concludes, based on the general theory of delegation, that
"government is not locked into existing institutional arrangements, and barring a restructuring effort
growing out of an attempt to censor, government agencies are free to undo their delegations."
Yudof, When Government Speaks at 244 (cited in note 24). For reasons I discuss throughout the text of
this section, I disagree with Dean Yudof and consider the first amendment a constraint on state
regulation of the expressive functions of its own institutions.
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"diversity of thought" in secondary schools may be unconstitutional in
colleges and universities, which have different functions. 24 '
Although institutional functions may not be as fixed as the functions of
traditional public forums, analogies to public forum doctrine are instructive.
A state could not simply announce that a park or a street is no longer a public
forum. Historic institutional functions may not have the "immemorial"

2 42
tradition the Court has cited in declaring streets and parks public forums,

but some institutional traditions are sufficiently strong and longstanding that
they deserve analogous recognition. 243 The rhetoric the Supreme Court
devoted to extolling the social value of critical inquiry in universities while
constitutionalizing academic freedom in Sweezy and Keyishian can legitimately

be read as judicial notice of valuable university traditions. The Court has
recently observed that all public streets "are properly considered traditional

public fora," making unnecessary any "particularized inquiry into the precise
nature of a specific street." 24 4 It is similarly appropriate to view all state
universities as devoted to critical inquiry. This university tradition may be
only a century old, 24 5 but it is also important to realize that the Supreme
Court's recognition in 1939 of the "immemorial" use of streets and parks for

communication in effect reversed an 1897 decision approving an observation
by Holmes that the legislature could "forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park."

2 46

Institutional functions may change over time, as the history of American
universities illustrates. Indeed, some see in American universities today an
increasing tendency toward "politically correct thought 24 7 that is the
241. 457 US at 879 (Blackmun concurring) (emphasis in original). See also Muir, 688 F2d at
1049 (Rubin concurring) ("Those state employees who are charged with operation of the station,
whether high or low in the managerial hierarchy, may have some right to free expression, which may
be stronger if, for example, they function in an academic environment devoted to freedom of
inquiry.").
242. Hague v CIO, 307 US 496, 515 (1939).
243. See Bazaar v Fortune, 476 F2d 570, 580 (5th Cir 1973) (citing Sweezy and Keyishian while
noting "the historical role of the University in expressing opinions which may well not make favor
with the majority of society and in serving in the vanguard in the fight for freedom of expression and
opinion").
244. Frisby v Schultz, 487 US 474, 481 (1988).
245. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
246. In Hague, 307 US at 515, the Court asserted that it had "no occasion to determine" whether
its previous decision in Davis v Massachusetts, 167 US 43 (1897), "was rightly decided." The Court in
Hague claimed that the ordinance in Davis "was not directed solely at the exercise of the right of
speech and assembly" in a public park. Yet this attempt to distinguish Davis was unconvincing. "For
the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park," the
Court concluded in Davis, "is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." 167 US at 47.
Professor Kalven's important article generating "public forum" analysis recognizes that Hague
essentially reversed Davis. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v Louisiana, 1965 S
Ct Rev 1, 12-13. See also Post, 34 UCLA L Rev at 1723 (cited in note 67) (asserting that the thrust of
Hague "is not that speech in streets and parks is especially important or unique, but rather that
government could not exercise proprietary control over such places").
247. See, for example, Scott Heller, Colleges Becoming Havens of 'Political Correctness,' Some Scholars
Say, Chron Higher Educ 1 col 3 (November 21, 1990); CarolynJ. Mooney, Academic Group Fighting the
'Politically Correct Left' Gains Momentum, Chron Higher Educ I col 2 (December 12, 1990);John Searle,
The Storm Over the University, NY Rev Books 34 (December 6, 1990).
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antithesis of critical inquiry. If this perceived trend toward ideological
conformity on issues such as faculty appointments and curriculum becomes
dominant, the university itself may undermine its traditional function and with
it the justification for academic freedom. But until pervasive evidence of such
change exists, the Supreme Court's recognition of universities as institutions
devoted to critical inquiry should prevail.
Consistent with this analysis of institutional function, the state could create
institutions sharing some characteristics with universities but not devoted to
critical inquiry. Illustrations could include postsecondary trade schools and
legislative research bureaus employing social scientists to provide intellectual
justifications for political decisions. But just as the 1915 Declaration argued
that "proprietary institutions" designed to inculcate ideas should not be able
"to sail under false colors" by calling themselves universities, 2 48 states should
not constitutionally be able to define as universities institutions uncommitted
to critical inquiry. Once a state creates an entity described as a university, a
library, a newspaper, or a television station, it should be under a first
amendment obligation to respect the expressive functions traditionally
associated with these institutions.
Unfortunately, a number of potential government actions raise close
questions that even this extended analysis cannot answer. For example, the
Supreme Court has recognized the "undoubted right" of a state legislature
"to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools" as long as these laws do
not otherwise violate the first amendment by constituting an establishment of
religion or by discriminating against a particular ideological viewpoint. 2 49 In
relying on the establishment clause to overturn a state statute requiring
instruction in "creation science," the Court recently made a special point of
stating: "We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific
critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught."2 50
Various
acknowledgments that greater freedom of inquiry is appropriate in
universities than at earlier stages of education, combined with the university's
academic freedom to determine "what may be taught" identified in the
repeatedly cited passage from Sweezy, could conceivably lead the Court to
impose more restrictions on legislative power to determine curriculum in
state universities than in public schools. 25 1 Yet the Court's untroubled
acceptance of legislative control over public school curriculum makes the
likelihood of such a holding at best uncertain. Would a court, for example,
invoke first amendment academic freedom to invalidate Texas statutes
requiring every state-supported university to offer a course in government or

248. See text accompanying note 23 (discussing 1915 Declaration).
249. Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 106-08, 107 n15 (1969).
250. Edwards, 482 US at 593. See also Pico, 457 US at 869 (school boards might have "absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum") (emphasis in original).
251. See DiBona, 220 Cal App3d 1329, 269 Cal Rptr 882 (Cal App 1990) (college administrators
have less discretion than school administrators to control curriculum).
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political science,. which must include consideration of the United States and
25 2
Texas Constitutions, and a course in American or Texas history?
The oral argument in University of Pennsylvania highlighted another
unresolved challenge to the scope of institutional academic freedom against
other branches of government. One justice asked the lawyer arguing on
behalf of the University of Pennsylvania to specify who wields the asserted
first amendment right to determine who may teach. "I guess somebody has a
right to say who may teach," the justice observed, "but does it have to be the
faculty?" The justice went on to wonder "what is the principle that . . .
members of a faculty have a constitutional right to ...replicate themselves?"
Could the right to hire faculty in a state university, the justice asked, be
reserved to a legislative committee or the governor?
The lawyer for the University of Pennsylvania found it difficult to respond.
He claimed that it would be a "harder case" to locate this constitutional right
in the legislative or the executive branches than in the faculty, but never really
stated why. After some fumbling, he ultimately asserted that if, contrary to
tradition, decisions about faculty hiring are made "by someone in
government, then it is that entity that would enjoy the first amendment
freedom."
"So the government," the justice interjected, "has a first
25 3
amendment right. That's phenomenal."
The Court's decision in University of Pennsylvania did not address the issues
raised by this colloquy, but its very occurrence dramatically underlines the
continuing uncertainty about the meaning of institutional academic freedom.
I find it striking that the university's lawyer seemed so unprepared for this line
of questioning and so readily conceded that a state legislature or governor
could assume the power to appoint faculty under the protection of the first
amendment. At least a plausible argument could be made that the
institutional academic freedom from legislative control over university
teaching established in Sweezy and Keyishian should be interpreted to preclude
a state legislature or governor from appointing faculty. The first amendment
interest in critical inquiry identified in those decisions is arguably threatened
by the potential that political control over faculty appointments may impose a
"pall of orthodoxy" over state universities and transform them into
propaganda vehicles indistinguishable from government agencies such as the
Voice of America.

252. Texas Educ Code Ann §§ 51.301, 51.302 (Vernon 1987). Professor Byrne, it seems to me, is
vastly overconfident in asserting that attempts by legislatures or administrative agencies "to compel
universities to offer students a particular liberal arts curriculum . . . surely would be
unconstitutional" as a violation of institutional academic freedom. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 331 (cited in
note I). Compare Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 624 (Random House, 1970)
("the government can prescribe the [broad] character of the curriculum for a particular institution,
provide what general areas are to be emphasized or omitted, even require the offering of certain
courses").
253.
University of Pennsylvania OralArgument at 8-10 (cited in note 214). The official transcript does
not include references to particular justices. My recollection from attending the oral argument,
confirmed by a law clerk who was also present, is that Justice Scalia asked these questions.
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The extent to which institutional academic freedom insulates state
universities from other branches of government, though presenting
numerous complicated and unresolved issues, remains largely hypothetical.
In the generation since the McCarthy period, the legislative and executive
branches have not intruded directly into the core academic decisions of state
universities. The University of Pennsylvania decision may not have protected
sufficiently the confidentiality of the peer review process from government
intrusion. Yet the Court plausibly distinguished between the legislative
attempts to monitor the substance of classroom speech in Sweezy and Keyishian
and the EEOC's effort to determine whether the university had engaged in
unlawful employment discrimination. The tension between the institutional
academic freedom of universities and the individual academic freedom of
faculty, by contrast, has arisen in a number of concrete contexts. It is to this
difficult problem that I therefore turn.
Ix
THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC
FREEDOM

The focus of several recent Supreme Court decisions on institutional
academic freedom, beginning with Bakke in 1978, has prompted some
commentators to conclude that constitutional academic freedom extends only
to institutions. According to these commentators, the traditional nonlegal
conception of academic freedom as a right of individual faculty members,
identified by the 1915 Declaration and widely accepted within the scholarly
world, lacks constitutional protection. 25 4 In my opinion, this conclusion is
mistaken. The accurate perception that the Supreme Court has identified
institutional academic freedom as a first amendment right does not support
the additional conclusion that the Court has rejected a constitutional right of
individual professors to academic freedom against trustees, administrators,
and faculty peers.
Early cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian recognized constitutional academic
freedom as an individual as well as an institutional right. In holding that
government inquiry into the contents of a university lecture "unquestionably
was an invasion of petitioner's [the lecturer's] liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political expression," the Court in Sweezy recognized
both academic freedom and political expression as individual first amendment
rights. 25 5 The appellants in Keyishian were faculty members whose continued
employment was conditioned on compliance with a state law requiring them
2 56
to sign a certificate that they were not members of the Communist Party.
254. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 255, 257, 313 (cited in note 1); Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1267,
1284-85, 1292, 1322 (cited in note 1). According to Professor Metzger, the professional and
constitutional definitions of academic freedom are "seriously incompatible and probably ultimately
irreconcilable." Id at 1267.
255. 354 US at 250.
256. 385 US at 591-92, 595-96.
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In holding this law unconstitutional, the Court warned that the "chilling effect
upon the exercise of vital first amendment rights must be guarded against by
257
sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being proscribed.The law, the Court observed, could be interpreted to bar the employment of a
teacher who simply informs his class about Marxism.2 58 The Court's
emphasis on the impact of the law on teachers indicates its focus on individual
interests in academic freedom.
No case to date has presented the Court with a direct conflict between
institutional and individual claims of first amendment academic freedom. The
closest the Court has come to analyzing this issue is a footnote by Justice
Stevens in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,2 5 9 a case brought by a
medical student challenging a faculty decision to dismiss the student on
academic grounds. "Academic freedom," Justice Stevens noted, "thrives not
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers
and students, . . . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself ....
2
260 A subsequent majority opinion
by Justice Brennan noted with approval the definition of academic freedom by
the lower court as "the principle that individual instructors are at liberty to
teach that which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their
professional judgment." 26 1 In addition, the Court's recent decision in
University of Pennsylvania, by facilitating discovery against a university in a Title
VII case while rejecting an expanded claim of institutional academic freedom
in confidential peer review material, recognized the appropriateness of
judicial scrutiny of individual faculty claims against the university. Although
the Court's holding applied only to EEOC subpoenas, its reasoning could
easily be extended to allow discovery of personnel files by an individual
professor asserting that a university appointment or promotion decision
constituted employment discrimination prohibited by Title VII or retaliation
for speech protected by the first amendment.
Various lower court cases, moreover, have directly addressed the tension
between institutional and individual academic freedom while adjudicating
disputes between individual faculty members and universities. In a decision
involving the dismissal of a Marxist professor, a federal district judge frankly
admitted that while academic freedom as an unenumerated first amendment
right "is well recognized, its parameters are not well defined." The opinion
identified "a fundamental tension between the academic freedom of the
individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration,
and the academic freedom of the university to be free of government,
26 2
including judicial, interference.257. Id at 604.
258. Id at 600.
259. 474 US 214 (1985).
260. Id at 226 n12.
261. Edwards, 482 US at 586 n6. Justice Brennan cited this definition to evaluate its use by a state
legislature, not to address its constitutional meaning.
262. Cooper v Ross, 472 F Supp 802, 813 (ED Ark 1979).
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Judge Posner, whose many years as a law professor undoubtedly
contributed to his appreciation of this issue, used similar language. He
observed that academic freedom, though frequently described "as an aspect
of the freedom of speech that is protected against government abridgment by
the first amendment," has an "equivocal" meaning. "It is used to denote
both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from
the government . . . and the freedom of the individual teacher (or in some

versions-indeed in most cases-the student) to pursue his ends without
interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict, as in
this case." 2 63 Judge Posner assumed without deciding that a university

administration could not forbid the chair of the art department from
displaying his stained-glass windows anywhere on campus. He acknowledged
the administration's concern that the content of these windows would offend
potential applicants and thus make it harder to recruit students, particularly
black and female students. Judicial interference with the administration's
attempt to protect the university's image, he conceded, would "limit the
freedom of the academy to manage its affairs as it chooses." But he reasoned
that even this legitimate interest could not justify an absolute proscription
against displaying the windows, although he did uphold the administration's
2 64
decision to move them to a less conspicuous place.

Other lower court decisions, without explicitly addressing the tension
between individual and institutional academic freedom, reinforce the
conclusion that individual professors can have constitutional academic
freedom claims against universities. In reviewing cases in which universities
denied appointments to Marxist professors, courts have reiterated that "no
more direct assault on academic freedom can be imagined than for school
authorities to be allowed to discharge a teacher because of his or her political,
philosophical, or ideological beliefs, .

.

. and the same would be true of a

decision not to hire."2 6 5 Recent institutional policies outlawing offensive
speech 26 6 and concerns about the danger of university and external attempts
to coerce faculty research into areas likely to attract corporate and
government funding 2 6 7 illustrate additional contexts that may produce
individual academic freedom claims against universities.
263. Piarowski, 759 F2d at 629.
264. Id at 630. See generally id at 629-31.
265. Franklin v Atkins, 409 F Supp 439, 445 (D Colo 1976), aff'd, 562 F2d 1188 (10th Cir 1977).
See also Oilman, 518 F Supp at 1202.
266. See note 63 and accompanying text.
267. See Stuart W. Leslie, From Backwater to Powerhouse, Stanford 55 (March 1990) (Stanford
University achieved preeminence in electrical engineering by attracting financial support and faculty
from military contractors and by directing its research program and curriculum to military priorities);
Eliot Marshall, Harvard Tiptoes into the Market, 241 Science 1595 (1988) (citing faculty criticism of
proposed university funding for commercial development of professor's efficient method of making
bacteria express human genes; concern that such projects would divert faculty from pure scholarship
prompted new program to assure all funded projects are of "highest intellectual quality").
Professor Eisenberg convincingly warns that the lure of external financial support from industry
and the military may tempt faculty members to compromise academic values. Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 Tex L Rev 1363 (1988). She directs
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Are Judges Competent to Review Academic Freedom Claims By
Professors Against Universities?

Some scholars who recognize the tension between individual and
institutional academic freedom advocate limiting the constitutional definition
of academic freedom to the protection of the university against the state.
Professor J. Peter Byrne offers the most comprehensive statement of this
position. 26 8 Byrne repeatedly argues that courts are not equipped to enforce
traditional claims of academic freedom by professors against university
decision-makers. 2 69 The appropriate role of the judiciary, he maintains, is to
exclude public officials from incursions into basic academic affairs, a role that
in his view protects individual faculty members as well as universities as
institutions. 2 70 Byrne stresses that judges themselves are public officials who
threaten academic freedom within the university. "Judicial views of civil
liberty," he argues citing Schmid, "may infringe academic principles just as
much as executive or legislative views of national security," 2 7 1 the impetus for
the landmark academic freedom cases of the McCarthy era. For a court to
resolve a faculty member's assertion that the university violated his academic
freedom in denying him tenure, Byrne portentously concludes, "would put
the department or school into intellectual receivership, with the court
2 72
determining the appropriate paradigms of thought."
I disagree strenuously with Professor Byrne's view that judicial review of
disputes between professors and universities poses an intolerable threat of
state interference with academic freedom. Title VII and first amendment
cases at universities have demonstrated that judges can respect academic
expertise and values while determining whether stated academic grounds are
pretexts for illegal or unconstitutional university decisions. However, I
generally agree with Byrne that judges should not review good faith debates
within universities about the merits of unpopular or unconventional ideas.
Byrne realizes that his conception of constitutional academic freedom is
inconsistent with the tradition of academic freedom derived from the 1915
legitimate criticism against recent AAUP reports on external funding of faculty research, whose focus
on threats to faculty academic freedom from universities seeking external funding neglects potential
abuses by professors themselves. Id at 1378-84. See, for example, AAUP, Academic Freedom and
Tenure: Corporate Funding of Academic Research, 69 Academe 18a (November-December 1983); AAUP,
Government Censorship and Academic Freedom, 69 Academe 15a (November-December 1983).
Professor Eisenberg and I disagree, however, about whether the traditional American conception
of academic freedom constrains faculty disregard of academic values. Compare Eisenberg, id at 1404
(the "traditional American conception of academic freedom, with its emphasis on defending the
professional autonomy of individual faculty members against universities, is ill-adapted to the task of
protecting academic values in sponsored research within universities") with Rabban, 66 Tex L Rev at
1408 (cited in note 19) ("the traditional conception of academic freedom constrains faculty
autonomy to protect academic values") and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Defining the Terms of Academic
Freedom: A Reply to Professor Rabban, 66 Tex L Rev 1431, 1434-35 (1988) (Rabban's "confusing and
misleading" usage extends academic freedom beyond any meaningful definition).
268. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note 1). See especially id at 255.
269. Id at 288. See also id at 255, 305, 306.
270. Id at 304. See also id at 255.
271. Id at 307. See also id at 307-08 n222.
272. Id at 306.
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Declaration, which focuses on the rights of individual professors, particularly
against lay trustees or regents. 2 73 Perhaps for this reason, he contrasts a prior
"dark age of faculty dependence" with the present, "when most universities
voluntarily defend the academic freedom of their faculties,"2 74 and the state
poses the most serious threats to professors and universities. Byrne thus
seems to believe that his constitutional theory of academic freedom makes
both theoretical and practical sense. Not only are the courts an inappropriate
forum for protecting faculty from administrators and trustees, but in the
contemporary world the real dangers to academic freedom come from the
state.
Byrne also constructs a "limiting principle" on institutional academic
freedom that would allow some legal protection for traditional claims of
academic freedom by professors against universities. According to Byrne,
"constitutional academic freedom ought not to protect institutions
resembling universities but which do not pursue genuine liberal studies-that
prohibit or consistently discourage professors from following controversial
arguments, that recognize no role for faculty in governance, or that seek to
indoctrinate rather than educate students." When universities "do not
respect the academic freedom of professors (understood as the core of the
doctrine developed by the AAUP)," Byrne reasons, they so deviate from the
values that justify institutional academic freedom that they should lose their
immunity from judicial review. Byrne anticipates that his limiting principle
would "lessen fears that institutional freedom will cloak extensive violations
of professors' academic freedom by institutions bent on intellectual
orthodoxy."2 75 Yet this language suggests that as long as administrators and
trustees do not "prohibit or consistently discourage" the exercise of
individual academic freedom as understood by the AAUP, they retain
constitutional academic freedom against judicial review of any periodic but
less extensive repression of academic speech.
Legal cases and reports of AAUP investigating committees provide ample
evidence that, even if the "dark age of faculty dependence" has ended (at least
temporarily), university violations of faculty academic freedom continue to
occur. Many of these violations, moreover, take place in universities that
ordinarily respect individual academic freedom. These abridgments of
academic freedom, like many state infringements of individual civil liberties,
are not frequent events, and thus would not fall under Byrne's limiting
principle. The broad institutional immunity advocated by Byrne would
heighten the danger that administrators and trustees might violate the
academic freedom of professors.
Elsewhere, Byrne seemingly departs from his limiting principle and
implies that judicial review is proper whenever administrators fail to justify
their decisions on academic grounds. Even under this standard, however,
273.
274.
275.

See, for example, id at 255, 267, 273, 288, 312.
Id at 324.
Id at 338. See id at 332.
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Byrne still insists that judges can evaluate solely whether administrators acted
in good faith and not whether the grounds themselves are adequate. 2 76 This
insistence leaves a crucial problem unresolved. Determining whether an
academic judgment purportedly made in good faith is actually a pretext for an
improper consideration, including one that might violate individual academic
freedom, often requires some assessment of the adequacy of the stated
academic ground.
Byrne confuses his analysis by referring to university administrators as "lay
persons" in some contexts but as "academics" in others. In discussing the
historical roots of the AAUP's conception of individual academic freedom,
Byrne recognizes that university presidents, whatever the identification they
might previously have had with the faculty, had become "institutional
executives and educational entrepreneurs," who shared the business values of
trustees more than the academic values of professors.2 7 7 Byrne applauds the
emphasis in the 1915 Declaration on the relationship between peer review
and academic freedom, deeming it "the insulation of the individual professor
from lay interference.- 2 78 Byrne here understands that the laity includes
administrators as well as trustees, although in discussing threats to the
academic freedom of professors he focuses more on trustees than on
administrators.279
In analyzing judicial review of universities' academic decisions, by
contrast, Byrne groups administrators with faculty as academics, while largely
ignoring trustees. He refers to "intra-academic" cases, 2 0 in which faculty
members claim violations of their academic freedom by "other academics,
usually administrators and department chairs." 28 1 Byrne may be correct that
some administrators are presumptively competent to apply professional
criteria in judging academic speech, 28 2 but this presumption weakens as one
moves up the hierarchy of university administration, and it is invalid as to
trustees.
Byrne finds it "incoherent to suggest that academic freedom could be
furthered by reducing peer review and substituting the enforcement of rules
by lay persons such as judges." Such a transformation "ignores both the
28 3
I
historical basis of, and the actual structures that protect, faculty rights."
276. See id at 300, 304, 306, 308.
277. Id at 270. See id at 272.
278. Id at 278.
279. Id at 273, 276.
280. Id at 309.
281. Byrne in this context finds it reasonable for the AAUP, but not for the courts, to criticize
administrators who reject the professional judgments of faculty committees "because it is that
association's business to enhance the sphere of freedom and control over academic administration of
its members." This language portrays a self-interested power struggle between faculty and
administrators that seems inconsistent with Byrne's repeated approval of peer review as a safeguard
of individual academic freedom against inappropriate intrusions by lay administrators and trustees.
At most, Byrne is willing to concede that this struggle may produce "workable norms" that should
not be enforced in "the coercive domain of law." Id at 308.
282. Idat 310.
283. Id at 286.
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emphatically agree. But this passage does not address the propriety of lay
persons such as judges enforcing peer review, and thereby protecting
individual academic freedom, against other lay persons such as trustees and
administrators. The theory that justifies judicial as well as administrative
deference to peer review does not support similar judicial deference to
trustees and administrators.
In addition, Byrne's examples of the dangers inherent in judicial review of
individual academic freedom claims against universities are frequently inapt.
He seems to assume, for example, that a constitutional right of individual
academic freedom would force courts to overturn administrative sanctions
against professors who deviate from prescribed curricular coverage or who
receive poor teaching evaluations from students. 28 4 But no accepted theory
of individual academic freedom, and certainly not the one developed by the
AAUP, would identify these professors as engaging in speech to which
academic freedom should attach. Academic freedom is not the freedom to be
a poor teacher or to refuse to include materials on the Civil War in a survey
course in American history.
Byrne also assumes erroneously that a constitutional right of individual
academic freedom would be violated if a university administrator, shocked
that the philosophy department has no expert on Plato and Aristotle, denies
tenure to a creative philosopher with an esoteric specialty. 2 5 Even if the
administrator had overruled a unanimous departmental recommendation, the
justification behind this decision reflects the kind of legitimate bureaucratic
concern over departmental balance that provides grounds for reversing peer
judgments under policies the AAUP accepts. Bureaucratic rationales similarly
would justify rejections of peer recommendations by administrators based on
programmatic or financial grounds, the candidate's professionally unethical
conduct, or the failure of peers to apply appropriate professional
standards. 28 6 By contrast, individual academic freedom would be implicated
if administrators denied tenure to a candidate because they feared his eclectic
interest in unpopular philosophical positions would alienate a potential
donor.
The most important response to Byrne is that judges can enforce the
academic freedom of individual professors against administrators, trustees,
and faculty peers without violating a legitimate conception of institutional
academic freedom or abandoning appropriate judicial deference to academic
decision-making. The judiciary is more deliberative and less political than
284. Id at 301.
285. Id at 308.
286. See AAUP, American Council on Education, and Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges, 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, reprinted in Academic
Freedom and Tenure at 90 (cited in note 6) ("Statement on Government"). See generally Rabban, 66 Tex L
Rev at 141 1-12 & n29 (cited in note 19). David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From
Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 Colum L Rev 1775, 1840-44 (1989), analyzes the legitimate
bureaucratic responsibilities of managers in universities and other organizations in which
professionals work.
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either the legislature or the executive. Indeed, in these respects courts may
resemble universities more than other branches of government. Courts are
likely to be more sensitive than legislators or members of the executive
branch 28 7 to the need for independent critical inquiry in universities and to
their democratic role as sanctuaries for unpopular ideas. These statements
are not merely speculative. A model for appropriate judicial review of
individual academic freedom cases already exists in numerous decisions
addressing claims by professors that universities have violated Title VII
prohibitions against employment discrimination or general rights of free
speech protected by the first amendment.
B.

Appropriate Judicial Review of Academic Decisions

Title VII and first amendment decisions demonstrate that judges, without
undue interference in university affairs, can review whether stated academic
grounds are pretexts. Whatever their holdings, these decisions emphasize
that courts should afford broad deference to professional expertise.
Academic decisions are necessarily subjective and beyond the competence of
judges. Courts cannot become a "Super-Tenure Review Committee"2 8 8 or
"evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made
daily by faculty members of public educational institutions."2 8 9 Rather,
judges should override "a genuinely academic decision" only if "it is such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
29 0
judgment."
This standard of judicial review, as the courts announcing it have
recognized, requires judges to evaluate the substance of the decision so that
they can determine whether "a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms" took place. In applying this standard, courts stress that decisions by
professionals are "presumptively valid" 29 ' and are subject to "very
limited" 2 9 2 judicial scrutiny. If a professional decision has "an adequate
factual basis for the conclusions reached," 29 3 a court should not substitute its
judgment on the merits for the views of the relevant professionals. The role
of judges is not to review and correct individual mistakes in academic
decision-making, but to make sure that the decisions reached by professionals
287. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 25-26
(Yale, 2d ed 1962); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process, " 83 Harv L Rev 518, 523-24
(1970). See also AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure: State University of New York at Stonybrook, 76
Academe 55 (January-February 1990) (AAUP investigating committee concludes that professor,
accused of equating Zionism with racism, protected by academic freedom against interference by
state governor and others outside the university in internal review of his candidacy for tenure).
288. Keddie v Pennsylvania State University, 412 F Supp 1264, 1270 (MD Pa 1976).
289. Ewing, 474 US at 226.
290. Id at 225.
291. Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307, 323 (1982), cited in Ewing, 474 US at 225.

292.
293.

Cooper, 472 F Supp at 810.
Olman, 518 F Supp at 1215.
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are consistent with constitutional and statutory obligations.2 94 Not
surprisingly, these stringent standards have prompted courts to reject the
overwhelming majority of Title VII and first amendment claims by individual
professors against universities.
Several courts, concerned that appropriate judicial deference to academic
decision-making "has been pressed beyond all reasonable limits," have
warned against a policy of judicial "self-abnegation where colleges are
concerned" that amounts to "abdication" of responsibility to enforce laws
protecting individual rights. 2 95 Academic freedom, they stress, does not
include the freedom to engage in employment discrimination or to violate the
free speech protected by the first amendment.2 9 6 Even courts that do not
express this concern look into the factual background of academic decisions
to determine whether a stated academic judgment was a pretext.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the merits of an individual claim by
a faculty member against peers, the administration, or the trustees, although
29 7
University of Pennsylvania makes clear that the Court is prepared to do so.
However, the Court has reviewed faculty professional judgment in a case
brought by a dismissed student. While stressing the importance of judicial
deference, the Court felt compelled to examine the evidence underlying the
faculty judgment before upholding it. The Court pointed out, for example,
that the dismissed student had low grades, many incomplete courses,
298
irregular or reduced course loads, and had failed his medical boards.
Lower courts have adopted a similar approach to Title VII and first
amendment claims by faculty members against university decision-makers. In
reviewing a claim that a university president unconstitutionally relied on a
professor's Marxist beliefs to reject him for department chair, one judge
emphasized that the president's reasons "must be examined critically and in
detail." 2 99 A thorough analysis of the record convinced the judge that the
president's reasons were not only sincere but also supported by sufficient
evidence.3

00

294. See, for example, Brown v Trustees of Boston University, 891 F2d 337, 356 (1st Cir 1989); Clark v
Whiting, 607 F2d 634, 639 (4th Cir 1979); Cooper, 472 F Supp at 810.
295. Powell v Syracuse University, 580 F2d 1150, 1153, 1154 (2d Cir 1978), citing Sweeny v Board of
Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F2d 169, 176, 177 (lst Cir 1978), judgment vacated, 439 US 24
(1978), appeal after remand, 604 F2d 106 (1st Cir 1979).
296. Powell, 580 F2d at 1154; Brown, 891 F2d at 360.
297. The Supreme Court's recent decision in University of Pennsylvania, 110 S Ct 577, by
facilitating discovery against a university in a Title VII case, recognizes the appropriateness of
judicial review of individual faculty claims. The Court emphasized that Congress explicitly
discounted the danger of improper state intrusion into university autonomy when it amended Title
VII in 1972 to cover educational institutions, which were exempted under the original 1964
legislation. Id at 582. University decisions based on race, sex, or national origin, the Court
observed, do not constitute the "academic grounds" protected by the first amendment right to
academic freedom. Id at 587 n7. The Court thus concluded that judges can enforce Title VII on
campus while recognizing "the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic
judgments." Id at 587.
298. Ewing, 474 US at 227.
299. Olman, 518 F Supp at 1203.
300. Id at 1215.
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Given the understandable concern about the competence of judges to
evaluate sensitive and subjective academic decisions requiring professional
expertise, it is striking how much of the evidence cited by judges in Title VII
and first amendment cases does not fall into this category. Rather, evidence
of pretext has frequently involved familiar judicial analysis of motivation
based on factors that are not unique to a university environment, such as the
.timing of a decision and objective quantitative data. One court found that
university administrators had violated a professor's first amendment rights
based on two key facts: the university had never previously dismissed or failed
to renew the contract of a full-time faculty member, and the university
administrators refused to reappoint the plaintiff almost immediately after he
created a state-wide public controversy by announcing his belief in
communism and his membership in the Progressive Labor Party. These facts
convinced the court that the faculty member's protected first amendment
speech and association, and not weaknesses in his teaching as the
administrators asserted, were the primary factors in the decision against
30
reappointment. 1
Similar examples abound. Testimony that the administration required
publication of two books from a female professor who was denied tenure, but
only one book from men who had received tenure, helped an appellate court
in a Title VII case reach the inference that the administrators' vigorous
criticism of her scholarship was a pretext for discrimination. 30 2 Another
judge upheld a finding of discrimination based on uncontroverted evidence
that a black administrator failed to renew the contract of a white professor
whose formal educational background met or exceeded those of black
colleagues who were retained and promoted. 30 3 On the other hand, a court
that complained about too much judicial deference to universities in Title VII
cases nevertheless affirmed the termination of a black female professor who
had established a prima facie case of discrimination. The court based its
holding in part on the fact that the professor lacked formal training in
30 4
architecture, the field in which she taught.
Although much of the evidence in these cases did not require judicial
analysis of sensitive professional judgments, courts have been willing when
necessary to evaluate the substance of academic decisions to determine
whether stated academic grounds were pretextual. One judge concluded that
a candidate for department chair did not have sufficient administrative
experience, and reviewed the conflicting testimony of distinguished scholars
to determine whether doubts about the candidate's academic qualifications
were plausible.3 0 5 In another case, a circuit court evaluated a complex
academicjudgment-that a woman denied reappointment lacked the ability to
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Cooper, 472 F Supp at 811-12.
Brown, 891 F2d at 347.
Whiting vJackson State University, 616 F2d 116, 123-24 (5th Cir 1980).
Powell, 580 F2d at 1151, 1156.
Olman, 518 F Supp at 1217.
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generalize from her admitted competence in her specialized research field to
broader issues in her discipline-to determine whether this criterion was
applied fairly not just to her, but also to men who were reappointed in the
30 6
same department.
Courts have cited "obviously weak or implausible" 30 7 and "ambiguous and
poorly substantiated ' 3 0 statements of reasons for personnel decisions as
relevant to determining whether stated academic judgments were pretextual.
Significantly, even in so doing, one court reiterated that the merits of
academic decisions are within university discretion and involve subtle issues
that may be difficult to articulate. Universities, the court added, need not
ordinarily document or explain their tenure decisions. Yet in analyzing a
claim that a university had violated a faculty member's first amendment rights,
"the paucity of supporting evidence implies that the reasons given by the
University were hastily prepared makeweight reasons which do not fully
reflect its true motivation."3 0 9 The unanimous recommendations of faculty
committees have also prompted courts, consistent with the theory of peer
review, to be skeptical of the administration's stated academic grounds for
3 10
reversing them.
C.

Judicial Review of Internal Debates Over Professional Quality

I have attempted thus far to demonstrate that individual academic freedom
is a meaningful concept under the first amendment. Courts have recognized
its existence in tension with institutional academic freedom, and judicial
techniques for reviewing faculty claims against university decision-makers in
Title VII and general first amendment cases can be applied as well to
individual claims of academic freedom without undermining critical inquiry.
Yet some professors do not allege that stated academic reasons are pretexts,
but that those reasons themselves violate academic freedom by relying on
intellectual orthodoxies. The university decision-makers may respond that
the candidate is not simply unorthodox, but professionally incompetent or
undistinguished. Should judges resolve disputes within the university about
whether unpopular or unconventional ideas reflect professional merit?
Many of these internal academic debates raise issues that could be brought
under conventional Title VII and first amendment theories. Departments of
linguistics, English, and economics might tell disappointed candidates for
appointment or tenure that studies of black dialects, feminist literary theory,
and Marxist economic analysis simply are not useful modes of professional
inquiry. Are these reasons evidence of racial, sexual, or political
discrimination?
Without raising broader issues of discrimination,
306.
307.
12 (1st
308.
309.
310.

Smith v University of North Carolina, 632 F2d 316, 342-44 (4th Cir 1980).
Brown, 891 F2d at 346, citing Kumar v Board of Trustees, University of Massachusetts, 774 F2d 1,
Cir 1985) (Campbell concurring).
Cooper, 472 F Supp at 812.
Id.
Brown, 891 F2d at 347-48; Kunda v Muhlenberg College, 621 F2d 532, 548 (3d Cir 1980).
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departments may consider quantitative analysis in history or cataclysmic
theories of biological change as professionally uninteresting. Do these
evaluations impose an ideological orthodoxy that violates the academic
freedom of professors denied appointment or tenure because they hold such
31
views? '
Recent controversies over the value of "critical legal studies" in law
schools prompted the AAUP to address these issues. Though the AAUP
admonished departments to base decisions on the professional competence
and integrity of candidates rather than on disciplinary orthodoxies, it did not
address the extent to which standards of competence within disciplines
themselves reflect conventional wisdom. The AAUP concluded that
departments do not abridge individual academic freedom as long as they
make academic judgments in good faith, a permissive though largely
undefined standard. Evidence of bad faith, the AAUP suggested, might
include consideration of the possible consequences of a candidate's academic
31 2
views or penalizing a candidate's "nihilism" about her discipline.
Unfortunately, too many academics find no merit in disciplinary
approaches that differ from their own. This position, though narrow and
arrogant, may be held in good faith. Indeed, professors who are most
obnoxiously confident in the superiority of their own views are also most
likely to be acting in good faith.
It is often impossible, moreover, to separate ideological from disciplinary
objections to academic work. Does a liberal law professor oppose critical
legal studies or the Chicago school of economics because he has political
objections to radical and conservative positions, or because he finds little
merit in their intellectual approaches to legal issues? Does a radical law
professor favor critical and feminist legal theory over traditional doctrinal
analysis for intellectual or political reasons? Perhaps in an extremely rare
case, a court reasonably could conclude that a claimed disagreement over
merit constitutes unjustifiable disciplinary orthodoxy. For example, the
explanation by a mediocre university that a prolific and nationally recognized
scholar with unorthodox views does not meet its academic standards could
legitimately be rejected by a court. But in most cases, where such enormous
disparities could not be proved, I favor judicial deference to departmental
decisions as long as stated disciplinary judgments are plausible and are not
pretexts.
311. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Competence, 53 L & Contemp Probs 155
(Summer 1990).
312. AAUP, Some Observations on Ideology, Competence, and Faculty Selection, 72 Academe I a (JanuaryFebruary 1986). An essay by Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J Legal Educ 222 (1984),
which contained the statement that "the nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not
matter has an ethical duty to depart the law school," id at 227, led to this AAUP document.
Correspondence provoked by Carrington's article is collected in "Of Law and the River, "and of Nihilism
and Academic Freedom, 34J Legal Educ I (1985). Rabban, 66 Tex L Rev at 1424-27 (cited in note 19),
discusses the tension between the academic freedom of the candidate and the academic freedom of
peer review committees in the context of disagreements about the value of a candidate's approach to
a discipline.
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In my opinion, critical inquiry is assisted by the inclusion of opposing
intellectual perspectives within the same institution, and professors should try
hard to find merit in disciplinary approaches they oppose. I object, however,
to constitutionalizing my own view about appropriate intellectual balance. I
agree with Professor Byrne that courts should not adopt a theory of individual
3 13
academic freedom that protects "all arguably respectable points of view,"

and impose on universities unwanted professors opposed by the existing
faculty in good faith on academic grounds. As Justice Stevens has effectively
pointed out, the academic judgments of universities, including the decisions
to "hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies" and to
"reward scholars for what they have written," should not be judged by the
same "compelling state interest" standard that applies generally to state
31 4
regulation of the content of speech.
Byrne essentially incorporates a good faith standard similar to the AAUP's
into his analysis of constitutional academic freedom, and extends it to
3 15academic decisions by administrators as well as by faculty committees.
Byrne never explicitly addresses administrative or trustee reversals of
academic judgments by faculty committees. Yet his general reluctance to
allow judicial review of internal university disputes over academic issues
suggests that he would also favor judicial abstention in this context, despite
his recognition that the system of peer review protects the academic freedom
of professors from interference by administrators and trustees.
Policies broadly adopted within the academic world, by contrast, suggest
that administrators and trustees are not entitled to the same deference
regarding academic issues as are faculty peers. The 1966 Statement on
Government of Colleges and Universities, endorsed by the AAUP, the
American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges, identifies the appropriate roles of different
constituencies in the shared system of university governance. Reflecting the
relationship between peer review and academic freedom, the 1966 Statement
asserts that in matters of faculty status, the governing board and the
administration "should concur with the faculty judgment except in rare
3 16
instances and for compelling reasons which should be stated in detail."
The Statement does not elaborate what these compelling reasons are, but the
1915 Declaration and essays on academic freedom by AAUP leaders indicate
that they include the failure of peer review bodies to follow professional
standards. 31 7 As one AAUP president observed, sometimes university
administrators and trustees have protected the academic freedom of
individual professors from faculty colleagues.3 1 8
Presumably, the
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
Freedom

Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 306 (cited in note 1).
Widmar, 454 US at 277-78 (Stevens concurring).
Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 306-08 (cited in note 1).
Statement on Government at 99 (cited in note 286).
1915 Declaration at 169-70; Appendix A at 402 (cited in note 6).
Fritz Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, reprinted in Academic
and Tenure at 177, 182-83 (cited in note 6).
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departmental bad faith recently identified by the AAUP 31 9 would constitute
failure to follow professional standards, as would evidence that faculty peers
voted for candidates based on friendship or politics, rather than on their
academic merits, an accusation increasingly levelled against academic
leftists. 3 20 A number of professors, for example, have recently claimed that
they were denied reappointment or tenure because they did not follow a
radical party line on issues involving the Third World or were too
32
"Eurocentric." i
This analysis suggests judicial deference to administrators who present
plausible evidence that faculty committees have deviated from professional
standards. But what if no such compelling reasons exist to overturn the
academic judgments of faculty bodies? What if administrators or trustees
simply disagree with peer assessments of a candidate's academic
qualifications? Should courts intervene in the name of academic freedom and
protect the proper operation of peer review, particularly when universities
themselves adopt the structure of shared governance endorsed by the 1966
Statement?
Judicial enforcement of faculty academic judgments reversed by
administrators or trustees without compelling reasons would support the peer
review process that contributes to academic freedom. In order to determine
whether administrators or trustees have produced sufficient evidence for
reversing peer evaluations, judges might have to assess the substance of an
academic decision. But judges already perform this task competently, though
hesitantly, in determining whether stated academic evaluations are pretexts
for reasons that violate Title VII or the first amendment. In addition, courts
would not be making entirely independent judgments. They presumably
would give greater weight to the more professional decision-maker, defined
by the Supreme Court as "a person competent, whether by education,
training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue."3 2 2 In Ewing,
the Court deferred to the professional judgment of the faculty in upholding
the student dismissal. 32 3 With respect to evaluations of professional merit, in
contrast to bureaucratic concerns such as finances or abuse of professional
discretion, the faculty peers, not the administrators or trustees, meet this
definition.
I nevertheless share Byrne's reluctance to allow judges to decide good
faith disputes between faculty committees and administrators or trustees
about matters of professional quality. Though not as draconian as Byrne
maintains, such a judicial role constitutes much more intrusion into academic
life than does judicial review of the merits of a decision to determine whether
a stated academic reason is a pretext. A constitutionally mandated policy that
319.

faith).
320.
321.
322.
323.

See note 312 and accompanying text (discussing AAUP treatment of departmental bad

See Searle, NY Rev Books at 34 (December 6, 1990) (cited in note 247).
Heller, Chron Higher Educ at I col 3 (cited in note 247).
Youngberg, 457 US at 323 n30.
474 US at 225-28.
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faculty committees always prevail over administrators and trustees in good
faith disputes over a professor's academic quality seems different in kind from
a constitutional requirement that judges must reverse a denial of appointment
or tenure upon finding that faculty peers, administrators, or trustees, though
claiming that the candidate lacked sufficient qualifications, actually based the
decision on ideological objections unrelated to merit or on fear that the
candidate's scholarly positions would alienate important legislators and
alumni. The 1966 Statement provides an excellent illustration of Byrne's
point that not all desirable university policies should be incorporated into a
constitutional definition of academic freedom. 3 24 However, administrative
rejections of peer recommendations on matters of faculty status, because they
should occur only "in rare instances and for compelling reasons" given
faculty expertise in this area, can provide grounds for suspecting that the
administrators were not acting in good faith and for examining the stated
reasons more closely. Judicial decisions in Title VII and first amendment
cases recognize this point by citing, as evidence of pretexts, administrative
reversals of unanimous faculty recommendations and weak statements of
reasons.

D.

32 5

The Status of Intramural Speech on University Affairs

Individual professors often claim the protection of academic freedom for
intramural speech on university affairs as well as for the views they express in
teaching and scholarship. Whether intramural speech by individual
professors merits protection under the first amendment is an important topic
of current scholarly and judicial debate. I address this issue here to provide a
more complete analysis of the tension between individual and institutional
academic freedom under the first amendment.
The status of intramural speech by professors has enormous practical
significance, for disputes over university policies and personalities have far
outnumbered classic academic freedom cases involving the content of
teaching or scholarship.3 26 The Supreme Court has limited the general first
amendment right of intramural speech by public employees to matters of
"public concern" and to speech that does not unduly impair efficient and
harmonious employment relations.3 2 7 Applying this standard, many lower
courts have found that speech by professors on a variety of institutional
matters either does not involve public concerns or impairs institutional
efficiency or harmony. 3 28 The limited general first amendment protection for

intramural speech, combined with the large number of disputes over this issue
324. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 308-09 (cited in note 1).
325. See notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
326. Matthew W. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 Tex L Rev
1323, 1337-38 (1988); Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1276 (cited in note 1).
327. Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983). The Court stressed in Connick that it would not
"constitutionalize" into a matter of public concern every grievance by a public employee. Id at 154.
328. Finkin, 66 Tex L Rev at 1325-27 (cited in note 326), provides examples.
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at American universities, tempts professors to invoke academic freedom as a
way to provide constitutional coverage that otherwise would not exist.
Yet as Professor Van Alstyne has effectively demonstrated, the
"promiscuous usage" of the term "academic freedom" to cover aprofessional
political speech has debased its meaning through overgeneralization and has
impeded judicial recognition of a legitimate, distinctive theory of academic
freedom as a subset of general first amendment rights.3 2 9 The same danger, it
seems to me, applies to disputes over intramural speech. A specific academic
freedom right to intramural speech, like other claims relying on academic
freedom, must be distinguished from general first amendment principles and
justified in reference to the value of critical inquiry that academic freedom
promotes. If general first amendment principles governing intramural speech
are as inadequate today as the general first amendment principles governing
aprofessional political speech were in 1915, the appropriate response is to
convince the courts to develop a better first amendment theory covering the
intramural speech of all public employees.3 3 0 It would be illogical, and
probably counterproductive, to leverage special protection for professors on
an extension of the specific theory of academic freedom beyond its legitimate
justifications.
Measured by their contribution to critical inquiry, the contents of
intramural speech reflect a wide spectrum. Faculty complaints about an
institution's parking or medical policies, though they could be connected very
indirectly to a professor's teaching and research, are too remote from the
value of critical inquiry to justify protection under a specific constitutional
theory of academic freedom. 33 ' Claims by faculty members that the
administration or governing board has violated the academic freedom of
colleagues seem to fall at the other end of this spectrum. Such claims do not
involve the teaching or scholarship of the actual complainants, but do seem
sufficiently related to concerns about critical inquiry to merit the coverage of
individual academic freedom. Much intramural speech falls between these
examples. Claims of administrative abuse of the peer review process and
disagreements over curricular and other educational policy issues seem
sufficiently linked to critical inquiry to come within the specific theory of
academic freedom. Disputes over salary or office space do not. 33 2 For me,
close cases include disputes over student admissions policies and the
allocation of financial resources to the library.
The key issue, however, is not how a particular close case should be
resolved, but the recognition that some intramural speech on matters beyond
an individual's teaching and scholarship should be protected by a first
amendment right of academic freedom. Examining whether intramural
329. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 60 (cited in note 22).
330. See Paul Brest, Protecting Academic Freedom Through the First Amendment: Raising the Unanswered
Questions, 66 Tex L Rev 1359, 1362 (1988).
331. See Mark G. Yudof, Intramural iusings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to ProfessorFinkin, 66 Tex
L Rev 1351, 1356 (1988).
332. See id at 1355-56.
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speech promotes critical inquiry-the touchstone of academic freedom
analysis-may lead to different results than examining whether intramural
speech raises issues of public concern, which is the touchstone of general first
amendment analysis. For example, a debate within a department over a
candidate's qualifications for tenure is less a matter of public concern, but
more related to critical inquiry, than accusations that a university president
abused office for financial gain. One could argue that the special theory of
academic freedom and general first amendment principles converge in the
context of intramural speech, because any topic related to critical inquiry is
also a matter of public concern. This argument, however, seems to stretch the
concept of public concern beyond its plausible limits. Such issues as the
decline in educational standards at a state university, on the other hand, may
be both matters of public concern and closely related to critical inquiry.
Moreover, under the general first amendment analysis of intramural speech,
the focus on employee harmony may be less salient in an academic context,
where debate is expected and even encouraged, than in other areas of public
employment.

33 3

Although the courts have not distinguished a specific theory of academic
freedom from general first amendment principles regarding intramural
speech, the separate opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Minnesota
State Boardfor Community Colleges v. Knight, while reaching different conclusions
in that case, suggest some appreciation of the relationship between intramural
speech and academic freedom. The majority in Knight refused to recognize a
"constitutional right of faculty to participate in policymaking in academic
institutions.- 3 3 4 "Faculty involvement in academic governance has much to
recommend it as a matter of academic policy," the Court concluded, "but it
33
finds no basis in the Constitution.-

5

Justice Brennan dissented based on his interpretation of the first
amendment protection for academic freedom. "The first amendment
freedom to explore novel or controversial ideas in the classroom is closely
linked to the freedom of faculty members to express their views to the
administration concerning matters of academic governance." 3 3 6 In his
opinion, "a direct prohibition of some identified faculty group from
submitting their views concerning academic policy questions for
consideration by college administrators would plainly violate principles of
' ' 33 7
academic freedom enshrined in the first amendment.
333. See, for example,Johnson v Lincoln University of Com. System of Higher Educ., 776 F2d 443, 454
(3d Cir 1985), citing "academic context" in finding first amendment protection for faculty criticism
of university president; Mabey v Reagan, 537 F2d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir 1976) (less need for harmony in
college than in high school); Landrum v Eastern Kentucky Univ., 578 F Supp 241, 246 (ED Ky 1984)
("there must be more room for divergent views in a university situation than in a prosecutor's
office").

334.
335.
336.
337.

465 US 271, 287 (1984).
Id at 288.
Id at 296-97 (Brennan dissenting).
Id at 297.
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Justice Marshall, by contrast, concurred in the majority's decision,
reasoning that courts should be less suspicious of restraints on faculty speech
by university administrators than by state legislators. He concluded that
universities are most likely to fulfill their social mission when they retain
autonomy from external interference. Courts should therefore "defer to the
judgment of college administrators-persons
we presume to be
knowledgeable and to have the best interests of their institutions at heart-in
circumstances in which we should not defer to the judgment of government
officials who seek to regulate the affairs of the academy." 338
Yet Justice Marshall maintained that in an appropriate case he would be
prepared to include within the first amendment "a measure of freedom on the
part of faculty members (as well as students) to present the college
administrators their ideas on matters of importance to the mission of the
academic community." Such freedom, he added, is essential for universities
"to advance the frontiers of knowledge through unfettered inquiry and
debate."3 3 9 As Justice Marshall's concurrence suggests, one could agree with
the majority that the first amendment does not require faculty participation in
university governance, yet still maintain that the individual right of academic
freedom under the first amendment protects faculty speech on matters of
educational policy related to the value of critical inquiry. Indeed, the majority
opinion, without referring explicitly to academic freedom, emphasized the
district court finding that all faculty retained their associational and free
speech rights to communicate with administrators about matters of
3 40
educational policy.
E.

Should Procedural and Structural Protections for Faculty Academic
Freedom be Included Within the First Amendment?

The AAUP and academic commentators often emphasize the importance
of various procedural and structural protections for academic freedom, such
as peer review, tenure, and faculty participation in university governance.
The Supreme Court has recognized in various nonacademic contexts that
procedural standards are necessary to protect substantive free speech rights
and has interpreted the first amendment to incorporate certain procedural
guarantees. Professor Henry Monaghan has felicitously labelled this
development "first amendment 'due process.' "341
Notice, access to
information, and rights to appeal during the tenure process are examples of
procedural claims related to academic freedom. One could also argue that
certain structural arrangements, such as peer review and faculty participation
in university governance, similarly are necessary to protect first amendment
rights of individuals and institutions. Professor Byrne, for example, maintains
that "the structural mechanisms within the university that give precedence to
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id at 294-95 (Marshall concurring).
Id at 293.
Id at 277-78 n4, 288.
Monaghan, 83 Harv L Rev 518 (cited in note 287).
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peer judgment . . . determine the content of academic freedom. '342
3 43
"Academic freedom," he adds, "has no meaning without peer review."
Yet, as Knight illustrates, the Supreme Court has rejected extending first
amendment academic freedom this far.
The Supreme Court's initial and most significant refusal to incorporate
faculty procedural interests within the first amendment occurred in a pair of
1972 decisions addressing the rights of nontenured faculty members denied
reappointment at state universities: Board of Regents v. Roth 34 4 and Perry v.
Sindermann.34 5 The AAUP filed briefs in both of these cases, arguing that
some procedural safeguards for nontenured faculty members are necessary to
protect their academic freedom. The relationship between procedural and
substantive rights, the AAUP emphasized, "is most significant in higher
education, where the Court's special concern for academic freedom is at stake.
It would be anomalous to hold that while all faculty members enjoy academic
freedom in the classroom and outside, only tenured faculty are effectively able
3 46
to vindicate or exercise that freedom."
The Supreme Court rejected the AAUP's position. The Court
acknowledged previous holdings requiring the opportunity for a fair hearing
before state actions that "would directly impinge upon interests in free speech
or free press." Examples included the seizure of allegedly obscene books and
an injunction against public rallies. Yet the Court denied that the nonrenewal
of a faculty member constituted an analogous context. "Whatever may be a
teacher's rights of free speech," the Court reasoned, "the interest in holding a
teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech
347
interest."
Just as the AAUP sought to encompass within first amendment academic
freedom some procedural protections for nontenured faculty members in
Roth and Perry, it attempted in University of Pennsylvania to attach first
amendment weight to the institution's peer review process. 348 Once again,
the Supreme Court was not convinced. Indeed, the Court sardonically and
gratuitously deprecated the value of peer review. After observing that
342. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 267 (cited in note 1).
343. Id at 319. See generally id at 267, 310-11, 318-20.
344. 408 US 564.
345. 408 US 593.
346. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 28, Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972) (No 70-36). See
also id at 11, 22-23, 26-28; AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 7-9, 14, Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US
564 (1972) (No 71-162). The AAUP briefs in these cases did not attempt to specify the procedures
necessary to protect the substantive right of academic freedom or to clarify the relationship between
academic freedom and the first amendment. But see William W. Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke LJ 841, 860-61 (the "first amendment itself implicitly affords the
right to a pretermination hearing or at least to some right of efficacious intramural or administrative
review sufficient to assure the timely protection of freedom of speech").
347. Roth, 408 US at 575 n14. Dissenting, Justice Douglas seemed essentially to agree with the
AUAP approach. He quoted the district court statement that "[s]ubstantive constitutional protection
for a university professor against non-retention in violation of his First Amendment rights or
arbitrary non-retention is useless without procedural safeguards." Yet Douglas referred to these
procedural safeguards as due process "apart from the First Amendment." Id at 585.
348. AAUP University of Pennsylvania Brief at 10 n9 (cited in note 170).
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taxation or other government regulation of universities, without violating the
first amendment, might deprive them of money they could otherwise use to
attract professors, the Court added: "We doubt that the peer review process
is any more essential in effectuating the right to determine 'who may teach'
than is the availability of money." 3 49 This dictum might be only a sign of
judicial frustration with an "extremely attenuated" university claim based on
dubious assumptions about the need for confidentiality in tenure evaluations.
It does, however, reinforce the Court's reluctance in Roth and Perry to extend
constitutional academic freedom to procedural protections for this
substantive right. The Court's rejection in Knight of Justice Brennan's
position that first amendment academic freedom includes faculty participation
in university governance provides additional evidence of this reluctance to
3 50
safeguard more than the substance of academic speech.
In my opinion, the inclusion of procedural and structural protections
within constitutional academic freedom is defensible but not necessary. The
"first amendment 'due process' " recognized in other contexts can plausibly
be extended to academic freedom. The right to a faculty position may not
itself be a free speech interest. But critical inquiry about professional issues,
the key function of professors, depends, as do other substantive free speech
rights, on procedural and structural safeguards. If universities can summarily
dismiss controversial faculty members, for example, the social benefits of
critical inquiry safeguarded by the individual academic freedom of professors
may too easily be impaired.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's apparent limitation of individual
academic freedom under the first amendment to a substantive right against
the university and the state has several significant advantages. Most
importantly, confining the scope of constitutional academic freedom can
increase its power within its remaining sphere. It may make more conceptual
sense to apply constitutional academic freedom to procedural and structural
safeguards than to aprofessional political speech or to intramural speech
unrelated to educational concerns. But in all three situations, denying the
protection of constitutional academic freedom may provide more popular and
judicial support for enforcement of its substantive core. In addition,
understandable concerns aboutjudicial intrusions into university life, as in the
debate over professional quality,35S are assuaged by letting university
35 2
constituencies themselves work out these procedural and structural issues.
The substantive individual right of academic freedom, as the Supreme Court
349. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S Ct at 588.
350. The AAUP brief in Knight was silent on this constitutional issue, though it emphasized as a
matter of policy that faculty participation in governance assists the search for truth, a familiar
rationale for academic freedom. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2, 4, 11, Minnesota State Boardfor
Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271 (1984).
351. See notes 312-25 and accompanying text.
352. "It is easier for faculty members to fight their board of trustees or administration,"
Professor Gutmann concludes, "than for them to wrest policy-making authority from their state
legislature or the U.S. Supreme Court." Gutmann, Nomos 25: Liberal Democraty at 280-81 (cited in
note 193).
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emphasized in Roth and Perry, can still be vindicated in court, even if the
absence of constitutionally required additional safeguards within the
university makes it harder to do so.
X
CONCLUSION

Although the meaning of constitutional academic freedom remains
ambiguous, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized it as an unenumerated
first amendment right with both individual and institutional components that
can be in tension with each other. Individual and institutional academic
freedom provide protection for professors and universities against the state.
But when a professor asks a court to adjudicate a claim that a university
violated his constitutional or contractual academic freedom, the university
may respond that judicial resolution of the professor's claim would constitute
state intervention in university affairs and thereby infringe the university's
own academic freedom.
It makes sense to derive institutional academic freedom from the same
value of independent critical inquiry that underlies individual academic
freedom, 353 but it perverts the first amendment and the concept of a bill of
rights to subordinate individual academic freedom to broad institutional
autonomy from judicial review. I have attempted in this article to suggest
clarifications in the constitutional meaning of academic freedom that would
enable courts to respect both individual and institutional interests. Individual
academic freedom should cover expression within a professor's scholarly
expertise and intramural speech on matters of educational policy.
Institutional academic freedom should similarly relate to the educational
functions of universities, such as the "four essential freedoms" identified by
Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy: selection of teachers, students, curriculum, and
pedagogy. Independent constitutional rights, such as the free exercise clause
and freedom of association, may protect the autonomy of private universities,
just as the free speech clause may protect the aprofessional political
expressions of faculty. But these additional constitutional rights, because they
do not address the distinctive functions of professors and universities, should
not fall under the rubric of academic freedom.
Courts are competent to review, without infringing the academic freedom
of a university, a professor's claim that a stated academic ground was a pretext
for a university decision that violated his academic freedom. Concern about
judicial competence and respect for institutional academic freedom, however,
should preclude courts from intervening in internal debates between faculty
and administrators over the definition of professional quality. Although peer
review, procedural safeguards in tenure decisions, and faculty participation in
university governance may all promote individual academic freedom, courts
should also be reluctant to impose them on universities as first amendment
353.

See Gutmann, Democratic Education at 177 (cited in note 193).
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requirements, particularly because doing so might weaken academic freedom
at its substantive core. Constitutional academic freedom, despite tensions
between its individual and institutional components, can protect universities

without sacrificing professors.*

* The Supreme Court decided Rust v Sullivan, 59 USLW 4451 (US May 21, 1991) while this
article was in final page proofs. One passage in Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion directly
supports my assertion that the traditional functions of public universities require first amendment
protection from government attempts to restrict academic speech. See notes 242-46 and
accompanying text; see generally Part VIIIB. See also Van Alstyne, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 109-10
(cited in note 24). After upholding against first amendment challenges government restrictions on
discussion about abortion in health care organizations that receive Title X funds, Rehnquist added:
This is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the
freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded
project, is invariably sufficient to justify government control over the content of expression.
For example, this Court has recognized that the existence of a Government "subsidy," in
the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas
that have "been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity," United States v.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1989) (opinion of
Roberts,J.), or have been "expressly dedicated to speech activity." Kokinda, supra, 110 S. Ct.
at 3119; Perry EducationAssn. v. Perry Local Educators'Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1988). Similarly,
we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so
fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control
speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of
Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-606 (1967).
59 USLW at 4458.

